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ABSTRACT
Kuvvet, Emre. PhD. The University of Memphis. May 2012. Corruption and
Ambiguity. Co-Major Professors: Pankaj K. Jain, PhD. and Christine X. Jiang, Ph.D.

This dissertation is composed of two essays. The first essay finds that corruption
decreases liquidity available to institutional traders and discourages foreign portfolio
investment inflows into a country. It increases investors’ order execution risks as well as
corporations’ cost of equity capital. These effects are noticed in country level panel data
regressions as well as firm level event-study tests for companies that violate the U.S.
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. The effect of corruption on foreign equity investment is
nonlinear and reverse J-shaped, with intermediate levels of corruption yielding the most
negative effects on foreign portfolio investment in our study of 49 countries, after
controlling for several other macro-level institutional variables.
The second essay empirically investigates how firm-specific certification
practices through corporate governance can reduce perceived ambiguity and thus enhance
liquidity of a firm in the stock market. We show that better corporate governance help to
reduce ambiguity. In addition, a reduction in ambiguity is significantly related to higher
liquidity of firms. Our results are robust to alternative model specifications, measures of
ambiguity, and corporate governance indices, and remain statistically significant after
controlling for other known determinants of ambiguity and liquidity. Our results shed
light on how ambiguity can be moderated through firm-level certification practices and
on the channel through which a moderation of ambiguity affects shareholder wealth.
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INTRODUCTION

Two essays in the dissertation focus on different topics. The first essay examines
the effects of country and firm level corruption on liquidity, investment flows, and cost of
capital. The second essay examines the impact of ambiguity on liquidity. The common
theme in the dissertation is to analyze the mechanisms through which liquidity in the
financial markets can be improved.
The first essay examines whether corruption significantly affects the crosssectional variation in liquidity, execution risk, total foreign equity, debt, and portfolio
investments, and the cost of equity capital on stock exchanges by formulating three
hypotheses. We also study the impact of corruption at the firm level by examining the
impact of violations of the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) on a firm’s
liquidity, execution risk, investment flows, and cost of equity. It is important to study the
impact of the FCPA on firm value and other financial metrics because, in recent years,
the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the SEC have steadily increased their anticorruption and anti-bribery enforcement initiatives and penalties. We test the competing
development and political views of corruption and its non-linear effects both by
examining a global panel dataset containing corruption perceptions at the country-level
and by conducting a firm-level event study surrounding the public announcements of
U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) violations. We find that corruption has a
negative effect on a country’s financial markets. Greater corruption not only decreases
the liquidity available to large foreign institutions but also discourages foreign portfolio
investment inflows into the country due to fundamental concerns. Another by-product of
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increased corruption is that both investors and corporate issuers can suffer (e.g., investors
experience greater order execution risk while issuers face higher costs for equity capital).
The second essay empirically studies how firm-specific certification practices
through corporate governance can reduce perceived ambiguity and thus enhance liquidity
of a firm in the stock market. An important development of recent research in finance
contends that uncertainty, in addition to risk should matter for the formation of asset
prices and other corporate decisions. Good corporate governance practices help to
prevent controlling shareholders from expropriating a firm’s resources. Firm-specific
certification provides a level of assurance for ambiguity averse investors that the “worst
cases,” which they fear, will be less likely to happen. To our knowledge, the empirical
relation between ambiguity and stock market liquidity has not yet been established. The
analysis of the relation is important because it could shed some light on the channel
through which a moderation of ambiguity affects shareholder wealth. Our results suggest
that better corporate governance does reduce firm-specific ambiguity. Furthermore, a
moderation in ambiguity is associated with better liquidity of firms. A lower level of
firm-specific ambiguity is positively associated with measures of liquidity such as quoted
spread and effective spread, even after controlling for a large set of known determinants
of liquidity.
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ESSAY 1
Corruption’s Impact on Liquidity, Investment Flows, and Cost of Capital
Introduction

The Department of Justice (DOJ) and the SEC’s anti-bribery enforcement
initiatives and penalties under the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) have made
front page headlines in the popular press almost on a weekly basis in the recent years.
Many other countries around the world are also following suit. For example, the U.K.
passed a major compliance regulation act (the Bribery Act) in April 2011. We provide the
first firm-level empirical analysis of the effects of corruption on portfolio investment
flows, firm’s cost of capital, and secondary market liquidity and execution risks for
institutional investors.
The effect of corruption and government influence on financial transactions and
capital investment inflows has been debated over the years and it can be either beneficial
or detrimental. According to the “development” view first noted in Gerschenkron (1962),
higher levels of corruption and government involvement in the private sector could
actually be beneficial to a macroeconomy by enabling investors to identify good
investment opportunities more accurately through the government’s screening of handpicked “cronies.” In this case, information asymmetries are effectively resolved by the
government’s screening of “winners” and “losers” within the economy. Similarly, La
Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2002) expand upon this positive “development”
view as the government can issue grants and loans when private parties are unable to
because information asymmetries between private lenders and creditors are too severe. If
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the development view is correct, then corruption and government involvement should
have a positive effect on a nation’s liquidity, foreign equity, debt, and portfolio
investments, and should decrease execution risk and the cost of equity.
In contrast, the “political” view described in Gerschenkron (1962), Shleifer and
Vishny (1994), and La Porta et al. (2002) suggests that higher levels of corruption leads
to larger information asymmetries between investors and issuers, thus creating the classic
Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) adverse selection, or “lemons,” problem associated with
investing in risky firms. This “political” view suggests a negative relation between
corruption (as well as with respect to the effect of government involvement in the
financial sector) and a country’s investor confidence. The government can use its control
of the financial system, as well as corruption, to reward government-favored borrowers,
cronies, with below-market loan rates and generous extensions of credit for projects
which are potentially ill-advised (i.e., large negative NPV projects for the banks), thus
retarding economic growth and investor enthusiasm. Thus, contrary to the development
view noted earlier, if the political view is correct, then corruption and government
involvement should have an adverse effect on a nation’s liquidity, foreign equity, debt,
and portfolio investments, and should also increase execution risk and the cost of equity.
The trade-off between the developmental and political aspects of corruption as
well as the differential abilities of domestic and foreign institutional investors to deal
with corruption can potentially make the effects of corruption non-linear in ways that
were not previously explored. For example, foreign equity inflows are expected to be
very high when corruption is extremely low. Such a transparent environment can create a
“level playing field” where sophisticated foreign investors can thrive with high quality
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fundamental research. In contrast, foreign equity inflows can decrease sharply as
corruption increases. A moderately corrupt environment could therefore give an edge to
local investors who may enjoy a closer relationship with corrupt government officials
than foreign institutional investors. At medium levels of corruption, local monopolies /
cronies can also twist the rules in their favor. Thus, dominance of local monopolies in a
moderately corrupt environment can force foreigners out of the market. Lastly, the
foreign equity flows may stabilize and perhaps increase when the levels of corruption are
extremely high. In this environment, all investors (including the foreign institutions) may
readily influence the corrupt government officials. Even if investors do not interact with
corrupt officials, the knowledge about which firms that are benefiting from corruption
may be pervasive (or even publicly known) and embedded in culture, thus creating a
“perverse level playing field” for both domestic and foreign institutional investors. In this
case, foreign institutions could competitively venture into these highly corrupt
environments.
We test the competing development and political views of corruption and its nonlinear effects both by examining a global panel dataset containing corruption perceptions
at the country-level and by conducting a firm-level event study surrounding the public
announcements of U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) violations. Our main
findings can be summarized as follows. First, we find that corruption and government
involvement have a negative effect on a country’s financial markets. Greater corruption
not only decreases the liquidity available to large foreign institutions but also discourages
foreign portfolio investment inflows into the country due to fundamental concerns.
Another by-product of increased corruption is that both investors and corporate issuers
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can suffer (e.g., investors experience greater order execution risk while issuers face
higher costs for equity capital). As for potential two-way interactions between foreign
investment and corruption, we perform Granger causality tests and find that corruption
Granger-causes lower future equity investments by foreigners whereas current
investments do not affect future corruption.
Second, corruption has a non-linear impact on foreign equity, debt, and portfolio
investments inflows that are consistent with the political view described above. That is,
our results indicate that foreign institutions invest heavily in economies with transparent
environments that are relatively free of corruption and their investments fall sharply to a
minimal level when there is a moderate amount of corruption. Ultimately, in a reversal of
this pattern, foreign investment does not decline further at extremely high levels of
corruption and, in some cases, foreign investment actually increases to form a reverse Jshaped pattern. For the country-level analysis, we analyze foreign firms listed in their
home markets rather than rely on U.S. American Depositary Receipts (ADR) data which
other studies have typically employed. The use of ADRs can be problematic because the
firms that issue U.S.-traded ADRs could mitigate the effects of corrupt practices in their
home countries. In contrast, the Ancerno dataset that we use provides detailed country
level and firm level transaction cost information for actual foreign stocks traded by over
700 institutions directly in the home markets of 49 countries.
In addition to the country level effects of corruption on global corporations
discussed above, we also examine the effect of firm level corruption on investor
perceptions. Several Fortune 500 firms faced investigations and enforcement actions by
the U.S. Department of Justice under the FCPA during the last decade, with the top 10
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settlements through 2010 exceeding $2.8 billion. Firm level analysis of the U.S. FCPA
violations reveals that charges of corruption against a firm negatively affect its stock
market liquidity and equity investment while also increasing a stock’s order execution
risk. Charges of corruption also increase the firm’s cost of equity capital. These firm level
findings are an important addition to the corruption literature that has mainly focused on
macroeconomic studies in the past.
Corruption can arguably be highly correlated with other macro-institutional
variables previously used in the literature such as the efficiency of a nation’s judicial
system, the legal origins of the country’s laws, and the degree of political constraints
within a nation’s system of government. We explicitly control for these possible interrelationships by supplementing our basic analysis with a two-stage regression analysis
and orthogonalizing the effects of corruption and government involvement. We find that
our results are robust to this orthogonalization process.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section I summarizes relevant
literature while Section II states the hypotheses. Section III discusses data selection for
our key variables while Section IV describes our empirical methodology and results both
at the country and firm levels. Section V presents our conclusions.

I. Relevant Literature

We define corruption as the misuse of public office for private gain (Klitgaard,
1991, p. 221 and Shliefer & Vishny, 1993, p. 599). Corruption defined this way would
capture, for example, the sale of government property by government officials at
unreasonable prices, kickbacks in government contracts and tenders, kickbacks in public
7

procurement decisions, bribery and theft of government funds, among other things
(Svensson, 2005, p. 2). On a more positive note about the effects of corruption, Lui
(1985) and Bliss and Di Tella (1997) note that bribery can efficiently allocate licenses
and government contracts because only the most efficient firms can pay the highest
bribes and inefficient firms are driven out of business.
The literature on corruption mainly focuses on macro-level investment valuation
studies and firm-level corporate finance studies. For example, Lee and Ng (2009) show
that firms from more corrupt countries trade at significantly lower market multiples by
using firm level data from 44 countries. Using estimated bribe payments of Ugandan
firms, Fisman and Svensson (2007) find that both the rate of taxation and bribery
payments are negatively correlated with firm growth.1
The effects of corruption can be quite negative in terms of discouraging
investment, reducing economic growth (e.g., see Cuervo-Cazurra, 2006; Kaufmann &
Wei, 1999; Mauro, 1997; Wei, 1999), and increasing the cost of financing government
agencies such as municipalities (Butler, Fauver, & Mortal, 2009). Beck, Demirguc-Kunt,
and Maksimovic (2005) find that corruption constrains firm growth, particularly for small
firms. Javorcik and Wei (2009) report that corruption reduces the volume of inward
foreign direct investment (FDI) and increases the value of using a local partner to cut
through the bureaucratic maze. Ahlin and Pang (2008) find that both financial
development and corruption controls appear to have positive effects on the growth of

1

Anecdotally, after Hong Kong established The Independent Commission Against Corruption
(ICAC) to clean up endemic corruption, its transparency index and foreign investment inflows improved
significantly. In addition, after Singapore established Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau (CPIB), it
moved within the top five least-corrupt countries in the world. In turn, these countries have become the
hubs of financial and investment activity in Asia due to their anti-corruption efforts.
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industries and countries. In addition, the negative effects of corruption encourage
politically connected / motivated investments which can mis-allocate resources, increase
risk, and raise the cost of capital for those firms that are not as well-connected.2
Ciocchini, Durbin, and Ng (2003) examine the relationship between corruption
and borrowing costs for governments and firms in emerging markets and find that
countries perceived as more corrupt must pay a higher risk premium when issuing bonds.
However, these types of studies assume a linear relationship between corruption and
financial variables. In our paper, we take cues from Pagano (2002, 2008) and show that
corruption affects the relative advantages of domestic players versus foreign institutional
investors in a nonlinear manner. He shows that corruption has nonlinear effects on bank
lending rates where low-to-moderate levels of corruption may actually lower commercial
lending rates while high levels of corruption can increase commercial lending rates.
Although similar in spirit to Pagano (2002, 2008), we differ from both of those studies in
terms of our basic research question as well as the expected effects of corruption (e.g. we
find a reverse J-shaped relation between corruption and foreign equity, debt, and portfolio
investments whereas Pagano focuses solely on corruption’s effect on bank lending rates).
Most importantly, in contrast to our study, none of these papers investigate the effects of
firm level corruption on liquidity, execution risk, foreign portfolio investments, and cost
of equity capital.
Prior research also identifies macro level institutional features other than
corruption that may have important effects on stock market performance. For example,
Eleswarapu and Venkataraman (2006) examine 412 NYSE-listed ADRs from 44
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See Faccio (2010), Fisman (2001), Garmaise and Liu (2005), Johnson and Mitton (2003),
Kaufman and Wei (1999), and Yin (2008).
9

countries and find that, after controlling for firm level determinants of trading costs, the
effective bid-ask spread and price impact of trades are significantly lower for ADRs from
countries with better ratings for judicial efficiency, accounting standards, and political
stability. Daouk, Lee, and Ng (2006) show that earnings opacity, enforcement of insider
trading laws, and short-selling restrictions affect trading volume and U.S. foreign
stockholdings. Therefore, we include these institutional details as control variables and
also perform an orthogonalized analysis of the effects of corruption and government
control of the financial system.3 Another control variable is the degree of market
fragmentation through cross-listings because Domowitz, Glen, and Madhavan (1998)
show that when fragmented markets are not informationally well-linked, then the
presence of arbitrage traders may reduce market quality and liquidity by increasing the
information asymmetry risk faced by market makers.
As noted in the Introduction, we also study the impact of corruption at the firm
level by examining the impact of violations of the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
(FCPA) on a firm’s liquidity, execution risk, investment flows, and cost of equity. It is
important to study the impact of the FCPA on firm value and other financial metrics
because, in recent years, the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the SEC have steadily
increased their anti-corruption and anti-bribery enforcement initiatives and penalties.
While FCPA-related fines in 2007 were $87 million, this number increased to $641
million in 2009.4 As shown in Appendix I, the top 10 financial penalties sum up to $2.8
billion as of July 20, 2010. Thus, the announcement of an FCPA penalty could have a
3

Our orthogonalized effects analysis closely follows the methodology in Daniel and Titman
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www.fcpablog.com/blog/2009/12/31/2009-fcpa-enforcement-index.html

(2006).
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significant effect on a firm’s market value of equity.5 In addition, although the U.S. is the
first country to enforce foreign corruption laws, many countries are also following suit.
For example, the U.K. passed a major compliance regulation act in April 2011. With
increased focus on anti-corruption laws in the world, firms are facing serious financial
penalties (criminal fines, civil disgorgement, and prejudgment interest), irreparable
damage to corporate reputation, and incarceration of corporate executives.
According to the Department of Justice, Congress enacted the FCPA in 1977 to
bring a halt the bribery of foreign officials and to restore public confidence in the
integrity of the American business system.6 In particular, the FCPA was enacted for the
purpose of making it unlawful for certain classes of persons and entities to make
payments to foreign government officials to assist in obtaining or retaining business.7
Since its enactment, the FCPA has applied to all U.S. persons and certain foreign issuers
of securities. With the addition of certain amendments in 1998, the FCPA now also
applies to foreign firms and persons who cause, directly or through agents, an act in
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For example, one of the most prominent FCPA settlements was Siemens. The SEC complaint
alleges that between 2001 and 2007, Siemens violated the FCPA by engaging in widespread and systematic
practice of paying bribes to foreign government officials in Venezuela, China, Israel, Nigeria, Russia and
Vietnam to retain business. Siemens created elaborate payment schemes to conceal the nature of its corrupt
payments, and the company’s inadequate internal controls allowed this conduct to flourish. The SEC has
required Siemens to disgorge $350 million in profits. Siemens will also pay $450 million in criminal fines
to the DOJ, making this the largest FCPA settlement in history. For more details, see
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2008/lr20829.htm.
6

www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/docs/lay-persons-guide.pdf

7

The FCPA prohibits the willful use of the mails or any means of instrumentality of interstate
commerce corruptly in furtherance of any offer, payment, promise to pay, or authorization of the payment
of money or anything of value to any person, while knowing that all or a portion of such money or thing of
value will be offered, given or promised, directly or indirectly, to a foreign official to influence the foreign
official in his or her official capacity, induce the foreign official to do or omit to do an act in violation of
his or her lawful duty, or to secure any improper advantage in order to assist in obtaining or retaining
business for or with, or directing business to, any person.
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furtherance of such a corrupt payment to take place within the territory of the United
States.8

II. Hypotheses

We examine whether corruption and government involvement significantly affect
the cross-sectional variation in liquidity, execution risk, total foreign equity, debt, and
portfolio investments, and the cost of equity capital on stock exchanges by formulating
three hypotheses. Against the null hypothesis of no effect due to corruption, we test the
alternative hypothesis that:
H1a: Liquidity and Execution Risk are significantly related to the degree of
corruption in the country. For example, the political view predicts corruption is
positively related to Execution Risk and negatively correlated with Liquidity and Foreign
Equity Investment. That is, the higher the corruption, the greater is the asymmetry
between liquidity providers and informed traders (who are more likely to possess
government connections) about the future performance of any stock. Conversely, the
development view predicts the opposite effects (e.g., a positive relation between liquidity
and corruption). In addition, both views allow for a possible non-linear relationship
between corruption and these variables of interest.

8

Since there are three provisions under the FCPA relating to: 1) anti-bribery, 2) improper bookand record-keeping, and 3) inadequate internal controls, we consider all DOJ penalties based on one or
more of these provisions as a “corruption event” for our set of publicly traded firms. We have only one
event in our sample that is purely an anti-bribery penalty and thus we cannot break out our data set to focus
just on this provision of the FCPA. (See www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/ for more details on the U.S.
FCPA.)
12

H2a: Foreign Equity, Debt, and Portfolio Investments are significantly and
nonlinearly related to the level of corruption. Trading costs also reflect the
perceptions of investors (both foreign and domestic) and liquidity providers about the
transparency and quality of corporate disclosures, as well as the reliability of sustained
financial performance by firms. In turn, perceptions of foreign investors can directly
drive the amount of capital inflows into the country. Thus, foreign equity, debt, and
portfolio inflows are expected to be very high with extremely low levels of corruption.
Corruption creates an information asymmetry between local investors and foreign
institutions. For example, issuing firms and / or local investors may more easily assess
the beneficiaries of corruption than a foreign institutional investor, who, in turn, might be
discouraged from investing. The information asymmetry may diminish for extremely
high levels of corruption when anyone, including the foreign institutions, may readily
influence the corrupt government officials to learn about the beneficiaries of corruption.
H3a: The cost of equity is significantly related to the degree of corruption. This
hypothesis suggests that higher levels of corruption within a country or firm lead to an
increase in the cost of equity. Easley and O’Hara (2004) demonstrate that investors
require a higher return to hold stocks with greater private information.

III. Data Sources and Variable Definitions

We collect panel data on corruption score, secondary market institutional trading
cost, investment flows, and cost of capital variables for 49 countries from 2004 to 2008 to
study the effects of country level corruption. Separately, we also collect panel data on
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corruption event dates, secondary market institutional trading cost, direction of
investment flow, and cost of capital variables for 27 firms from 2000 to 2009.
A. Our measure of corruption

Our corruption measure is based on Transparency International’s Corruption
Perceptions Index (CPI), which is a composite index, or poll of polls, that ranks countries
in terms of the degree to which corruption is perceived to exist among public officials
and politicians. It is also used extensively by other researchers such as Treisman (2000),
Svensson (2005), Faccio (2010), Pagano (2002, 2008), Ciocchini, Durbin, and Ng (2003),
Yin (2008), and many others.9
The CPI is reported on a scale of 1 (most corrupt) to 10 (least corrupt) but, for
ease of understanding, our Corruption variable is the inverse of the yearly value of the
CPI for each country. As a result of our inversion, the variable can range between 0 and
1, where higher numbers imply greater corruption. For example, several countries
including Australia tie as the least corrupt countries with a corruption score of 0.11 while
Venezuela ranks as the most corrupt country with a score of 0.44.
To analyze the impact of corruption at the firm level, we begin with the list of all
firms that were indicted under the U.S. FCPA obtained from the Department of Justice
(DOJ), Shearman & Sterling Inc, and Trace International. Appendix I shows our sample
firms that were indicted and are in our Ancerno and other datasets. Our sample includes
prominent FCPA settlements such as Siemens, Halliburton, and many others. We collect
both the regulatory action date as well as the date of the first press release about the case.

9

Details about the index’s construction are available in the historical data section of the
organization’s website at www.tranparency.org.
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Announcement dates are obtained from Lexis-Nexis. Appendix I also shows financial
penalties for those cases. Due to the secretive nature of the investigations, the regulatory
action date and the first press release date often coincide. Since investors may react more
strongly to the regulatory action dates, we present the analysis using the dates when
actual penalties were disclosed. Nonetheless, the key findings hold when we use the first
public announcement about the case as well. We did not include Alcatel case due to the
Alcatel-Lucent merger and acquisition. However; the results remain the same when we
include this case.

B. Proxies for Liquidity, Order Execution Risk, and Equity Purchases

We use institutional trading data aggregated at quarterly intervals by an
independent brokerage firm’s analytical service, Ancerno Ltd. (launched as an
independent entity by Abel/Noser Corp. in 2007).10 One of our key measures of market
quality pertains to the price impact of institutional trades defined as follows:
Price Impact = (Execution Price – Prior Day Close Price) / Prior Day Close Price * Trade
Indicator

(1)

Trade Indicator is equal to -1 if the trade is a Buy and +1 if the trade is a Sell.
Buys executed above the prior day’s closing price are reported as negative values (as well
as Sells executed below the prior day’s closing price). Note that this equation ensures that
10

This service provides trading cost analysis to over 700 institutional investors, advisors, hedge
funds, consultants and brokers with over $7.5 trillion in annual trading of about 13,000 stocks domiciled in
60 countries that trade on nearly 100 exchanges and venues. Countries in our sample represent more than
86% of the world’s equity market capitalization of listed companies as of 2008 (based on the 2009 World
Development Indicators available from the World Bank). This and other similar datasets are used widely in
academic papers focusing on institutional trading costs, such as those by Goldstein, Irvine, Kandel, and
Weiner (2009), Chiyachantana, Jain, Jiang, and Wood (2004), and Keim and Madhavan (1996).
15

lower numbers imply poorer liquidity (i.e., more negative numbers mean higher
transaction costs or lower liquidity) and higher numbers imply better liquidity. The
conclusions remain the same when we use Open of the Day Price as an alternative
benchmark instead of Prior Day Close Price. Price Impact and brokerage commissions
are expressed in basis points and have negative signs in the Ancerno database. Negative
values thus represent cash outflows due to institutional-level transaction costs. We
analyze the trading cost measures separately but also define a composite liquidity
measure as the sum of price impact and brokerage commissions:
Liquidity = Price Impact + Commission

(2)

We also define the order Execution Risk as the absolute value of the difference
between 75th and 25th percentiles of the liquidity measure. Anand, Puckett, Irvine, and
Venkataraman (2010) use a similar proxy for execution risk (the standard deviation of
institutional trading cost).
Firm level liquidity is computed similarly to country level Liquidity, as described
earlier in Equation (2). For firm level Execution Risk (in basis points), we are also able to
compute the standard deviation of institutional trading cost (our liquidity measure)
following Anand et al. (2010). This standard deviation of trading costs is calculated daily
based on all individual transactions for a firm during that particular day.

C. Foreign Equity, Debt, and Portfolio Investments

To measure the attractiveness of a nation’s equity markets to foreign investors, we
analyze the net capital investment in a country’s equity markets using two alternative
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data sources, one from the IMF and another from Ancerno. First, we use the Coordinated
Portfolio Investment Survey (CPIS) from IMF
(http://www.imf.org/external/np/sta/pi/cpis.htm). This survey of central banks measures
Equity Held by Foreigners for each country from 2001 to 2009 at market prices.11 We
then define Equity Held by Foreigners / GDP as our first measure. Note that this variable
can be higher than 100% for countries that have high foreign equity investment inflow
relative to their nominal GDP. We also measure the attractiveness of a nation’s debt
market by using Debt Held by Foreigners / GDP. The Total Portfolio Investment by
Foreigners / GDP variable is also obtained from CPIS.
Our alternative measure of equity investments in a country is the cumulative
institutional buying activity (in U.S. dollars) from the Ancerno dataset for all stocks in a
given country executed in the given calendar year by all the institutions in our sample
(and normalized by the country’s nominal GDP). For the firm level equity investment
analysis, we use a measure of equity investment based on firm-specific data from the
Ancerno database, where Buy Shares / Shares Outstanding % is the daily total shares
bought divided by shares outstanding (in percentage format).

D. Cost of Equity, Macro-Institutional Features, and Control Variables

We use a measure of an expected return as a proxy for the cost of equity capital
for our sample countries. Excess return over T-bill (ERT) is the country’s stock index
11

Equity inflows are shown in Table 3.1 of CPIS data at
http://www.imf.org/external/np/sta/pi/topic.htm and include ordinary shares, stocks, participating
preferences shares, depository receipts denoting ownership of equity securities issued by non-residents.
Market values of unlisted firms are calculated by using one of the following methods: (1) a recent
transaction price, (2) directors’ valuation, or (3) net asset value.
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return in U.S. dollars minus the one month U.S. T-bill rate (in percentage terms). The raw
return is monthly and obtained from Datastream country indices from 2001 to 2009. We
compute Excess world return by subtracting the U.S. risk-free rate from the gross world
market return (in percentage terms).
We use annual data from Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Levine (2010) for our
Government Involvement in the Financial Sector variable. This variable represents the
claims on the domestic nonfinancial sector by the central bank as a share of GDP and has
been shown by La Porta et al. (2002) as a potentially important factor in determining the
cross-sectional variation in country-level measures of financial and economic
performance.
Based on the findings of Eleswarapu and Venkataraman (2006) noted earlier, we
also include legal origins, efficiency of judicial system, accounting standards, and antidirector rights from La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998) as variables
to control for institutional factors that may influence a market’s liquidity, execution risk,
foreign equity, debt, and portfolio investments by investors. Furthermore, we also control
for exchange-specific trading rules such as the Insider trading rules index, Volume
manipulation rules index, and Price manipulation rules index, as described in Cumming,
Johan, and Li (2011). Other market design variables that can affect liquidity include
short-selling feasibility for each country (obtained from Daouk, Lee & Ng, 2006), the
number of exchanges within the country from the Handbook of World Stock, Derivative,
and Commodity Exchanges, and the age of the leading stock exchange from Jain (2005).
As additional control variables in our liquidity and execution risk regressions at
the country level, we also include stock market turnover, GDP, market capitalization,
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cross-listing intensity, volatility, and regional dummies based on information provided by
Datastream, World Federation of Exchanges databases, and World Development
Indicators Online (World Bank: https://publications.worldbank.org/register/WDI). At the
firm level versions of these regressions, we also include several control variables from
CRSP used in the previous literature. For example, firm Size is based on market
capitalization (in thousands of dollars). Volume is the total number of shares of a stock
traded on that day. The Market Return is the CRSP Equal-Weighted daily return. Return
is the daily return for the stock (expressed in percentage).
For the firm level Cost of Equity Capital analysis, we extract daily returns of the
firm in excess of the risk free rate (expressed in percentage) from CRSP. Control
variables in this analysis include the Fama-French (1993) factors of SMB, HML, and the
U.S. market return in excess of T-bill rate, as well as Jegadeesh and Titman’s (1993)
momentum factor, UMD. These Fama-French and momentum factors (measured on a
monthly basis) are also included in the country level cost of equity capital models.

IV. Empirical methodology and results

A. Summary statistics

Table 1 shows country-wise descriptive statistics Average Corruption Score, our
key explanatory variable, has a mean of 0.20 in Panel A for the overall sample and it
ranges from a minimum of 0.11 to a maximum of 0.44. Government Involvement,
measured by central bank assets as a percentage of GDP, averages 4.35% with a
minimum of 0.02% and a maximum of 32.9%.
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The mean value of our first dependent variable, Liquidity, is -68.68 bps. Stocks
from Jordan have the highest one-way transaction costs (or lowest liquidity) for
institutional traders at -121.19 bps. Liquidity in U.S. stocks is better than average and
stands at -53.71 bps. Later, we control for order durations and other order characteristics
as transaction cost outflows are lower for orders executed within a day compared to those
taking multiple days.12 The average for Execution Risk is 184.68 bps and the range is
from 93 to 287 bps. The mean of Equity Investment Held by Foreigners is 78.41% of
GDP. Average Institutional Buy Volume is 13.10% of GDP. The mean value of Debt
Held by Foreigners is 105.57% of GDP and the mean of Total Portfolio Investment by
Foreigners is 183.90% of GDP.
Domowitz et al. (2001), as well as Chiyachantana et al. (2004), calculated
institutional trading costs for a number of countries and both of these sets of estimates are
highly correlated with our Ancerno measures. For example, the correlation between our
total trading cost measure and Domowitz et al. (2001) is 0.60 and our measure is also
highly correlated with Chiyachantana et al. (2004) at 0.64, statistically significant at the
1% level. Thus, our total trading cost measure is consistent with other institutional
trading cost measures in the previous literature.
Panel D of Table 1 shows the correlation coefficients between our main variables.
The correlations coefficients of Corruption with Liquidity, Execution Risk, Equity Held
by Foreigners, Institutional Buy Volume, Debt Held by Foreigners, and Total Portfolio
12

Panel C of Table 1 shows the breakdown of total one-way trading costs by order direction and
order duration. The mean of total trading costs for buy orders executed in a single day is -38.69 basis points
(the product of price impact and order direction). The average of buy orders for multiple-day orders is 76.02 bps. In contrast, the mean of sell orders executed in a single day is -17.83 basis points while the mean
of sells executed in multiple days is -53.74 basis points. These results are consistent with the previous
literature such as Keim and Madhavan (1996) which finds that a buy order’s price impact is stronger than a
sell order’s. In addition, the average brokerage commission is -20.24 basis points.
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Investment by Foreigners are -0.30, 0.32, -0.17, -0.41, -0.18, and -0.18 respectively, and
these coefficients are statistically significant at 1%. Thus, corruption is associated with
decreases in liquidity and capital investment inflows, as well as increases in trade
execution risks. Government involvement has similar effects. Most of these results also
remain intact after orthogonalizing the corruption and government involvement
variables.13 The correlation coefficients between our orthogonalized Corruption Residual
and Liquidity, Execution Risk, Equity Held by Foreigners, Institutional Buy Volume,
Debt Held by Foreigners, and Total Portfolio Investment by Foreigners are -0.17, 0.15, 0.22, -0.09, -0.19, and -0.21 respectively, and are all significant at the 1% level. These
preliminary indicators are consistent with our alternative hypotheses, H1a and H2a, and
motivate our univariate and multivariate empirical tests.

13

The orthogonalization procedure and relevant equations are described in more detail when we
discuss the multivariate regressions later in Section IV. In essence, we capture the residuals from a
regression equation where corruption is the dependent variable and various macro-institutional factors are
on the right hand side. The idea is to assess the pure effects of corruption from these residuals that are free
of the inter-related effects of other macro-institutional factors.
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Table 1
Descriptive Statistics of Corruption, Government Involvement, Liquidity, Execution
Risk, Equity Held by Foreigners, Debt Held by Foreigners, and Control Variables
Panel A reports our key variables by country. The first column shows the total number of Ancerno clients’
institutional trades in the respective home market during 2004-2008. Corruption is the inverse of
Corruption Perception Index (Transparency International) such that higher numbers in the table indicate
greater corruption. The proxy for Government Involvement is the percentage claims on domestic
nonfinancial sector by the Central Bank as a share of GDP from Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Levine (2010).
Liquidity is the product of minus one and total trading cost, which is defined as the sum of the median of
brokerage commission for each country in basis points and the median value of market impact measure in
basis points. More negative values represent higher trading cost or lower liquidity while higher numbers
imply better liquidity. Execution Risk is the absolute value of difference between 75th and 25th percentiles of
total trading cost. Equity Held by Foreigners, Debt Held by Foreigners, and Total Portfolio Investment by
Foreigners are from Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey (IMF). These are scaled and expressed as
percent of GDP. The alternative measure of equity investments in a country is the institutional buying
activity from the Ancerno dataset, Institutional Buy Volume / GDP. Institutional buying in a country’s
stocks for each calendar year is defined as the total institutional buy volume, which is the sum of all buy
orders for all stocks in a given country, executed in the given calendar year by the institutions in our sample
and is normalized by nominal GDP. Panel B shows the summary statistics for the overall sample. Panel C
shows the breakdown of total trading costs by order direction and order duration. Panel D shows Pearson
Correlation Coefficients.
Country

Number
of trades

Corrup
tion

Governm
ent
Involvem
ent

Liquid
ity

Executi
on Risk

Equity
Held by
Foreign
ers/GDP

Institutio
nal Buy
Volume/
GDP

Debt
Held by
Foreigner
s/GDP

Argentina
Australia
Austria
Belgium
Brazil
Canada
Chile
Colombia
Cyprus
Denmark
Egypt
Finland
France
Germany
Greece
Hong Kong
Iceland
India
Indonesia
Ireland
Israel
Italy
Japan
Jordan
Korea
Luxem

19602
1488978
256262
412599
552841
2028362
37168
2650
401
320693
37955
661838
3588508
2813287
344910
1841308
2807
422560
185532
448774
175862
1572258
9636759
263
844890
48842

0.35
0.11
0.12
0.14
0.28
0.12
0.14
0.26
0.17
0.11
0.32
0.11
0.14
0.13
0.22
0.12
0.11
0.31
0.43
0.13
0.16
0.2
0.14
0.2
0.2
0.12

8.89
3.71
1.01
0.4
13.43
3.24
3.83
0.65
11.64
0.66
32.9
0.09
0.54
0.19
6.3
.
0.08
2.18
9.22
0.02
1.26
4.82
16.48
5.43
1.13
0.21

-100.81
-59.41
-46.79
-40.39
-76.12
-61.37
-76.59
-60.2
-68.22
-43.78
-81.85
-50.81
-47.01
-52.84
-63.9
-75.83
-62.79
-98.93
-107.35
-46.23
-66.54
-53.42
-88.15
-121.19
-114.46
-43.35

208.95
162.37
175.83
147.9
254.5
184.15
197.6
183.16
279.85
167.98
287.43
194.17
135.36
141.71
198.73
201.67
93.31
249.84
277.35
179.7
176.21
133.56
151.79
100.97
219.03
261.22

4.78
22.81
21.74
56.08
0.37
34.71
26.04
0.84
13.65
37.95
0.83
36.79
26.06
23.21
4.63
164.83
66.41
0.04
0.07
208.92
7.5
23.03
10.17
.
4.76
2228

0.2
14.96
8.15
9.18
17.15
13.98
1.11
0.09
0.1
9.94
2.49
31.93
17.34
12.65
10.19
68.55
0.25
3.98
3.67
16.22
9.22
8.21
16.82
0.03
10.75
12.51

3.3
11.65
74.95
102.02
0.6
8.99
8.34
3.86
119.52
44.12
1.2
50.12
72.53
43.41
28.35
125.27
24.19
0
0.47
450.4
13.72
31.01
40.5
.
4.29
2831
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Total Portfolio
Investment
by
Foreigners
/GDP
8.08
34.51
96.69
158.1
0.96
43.53
34.25
4.7
133.18
82.29
2.03
86.91
98.26
66.47
32.98
290.38
91.88
0.05
0.56
659.04
21.21
54.04
50.67
.
9.02
5051

Table 1
Descriptive Statistics of Corruption, Government Involvement, Liquidity, Execution
Risk, Equity Held by Foreigners, Debt Held by Foreigners, and Control Variables
Malaysia
Mexico
Morocco
Netherlands
New
Zealand
Norway
Pakistan
Panama
Peru
Philippines
Portugal
Singapore
South
Africa
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
Taiwan
Thailand
Turkey
United
Kingdom
Uruguay
USA
Venezuela

Statistics

236979
302013
301
1576435
58272

0.2
0.29
0.29
0.11
0.11

1.12
.
2.08
0.14
2.51

-80.85
-68.78
-73.24
-47.21
-28.47

188.86
193.31
182.16
144.23
135.98

3.16
0.36
.
71.13
18.98

8.3
2.35
0.03
23.79
2.17

1.92
0.78
.
106.85
6.03

5.08
1.15
.
180.21
25

625563
1608
5481
12422
65875
105578
602599
453771

0.12
0.41
0.31
0.29
0.41
0.16
0.11
0.21

.
6.4
12.93
0.02
4.27
0.12
2.98
1.14

-57.68
-115.26
-83.37
-57.1
-77.68
-34.34
-75.46
-71.76

207.73
178.9
233.68
209.43
255.87
136.42
194.43
191.15

49.22
0.13
3.81
.
0.11
16.42
75.68
23.77

18.47
0.19
2.15
1.25
2.19
4.41
22.02
17.32

67.71
0.06
22.16
.
4.78
60.38
102.34
1.84

116.79
0.19
25.98
.
4.91
77.23
179.9
25.61

978304
1096396
2796389
736988
85665
198986
12181113

0.15
0.11
0.11
0.17
0.28
0.26
0.12

1.66
.
1.6
.
2.04
2.68
1.82

-38.96
-55.59
-49.43
-85.48
-80.12
-94.85
-48.15

125.25
170.71
134.06
199.31
280.51
256.19
122.97

11.03
56.7
96.96
.
0.84
0.02
46.51

8.82
25.42
80.23
.
2.25
4.74
39.68

37.56
31.49
120.03
.
2.68
0.3
63.31

48.56
87.82
216.9
.
3.48
0.32
109.51

387
175976578
98

0.16
0.14
0.44

13.24
5.68
0.63

-68.22
-53.71
-111.17

112.68
121.09
109.82

0.59
28.56
0.23

0.02
63.3
0
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11.13
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4.14

Executi
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Panel B: Overall summary statistics for 49 countries
Number of
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Gover
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trades
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49

49

44

49

49

45

48

45

Total
Portfoli
o
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ent by
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MEAN

4609055.3

0.2

4.35

-68.68

184.68

78.41

13.1

105.57

183.9

STD

25090507

0.1

6.14

22.72

51.23

330.44

17.62

421.94

750.33

MIN

98

0.11

0.02

-121.19

93.31

0.02

0

0

0.05

MAX

175976578

0.44

32.9

-28.47

287.43

2228.14

80.23

2831.63

5051.43

N

Panel C: Breakdown of total liquidity costs by order direction and order duration.
Statistics
Buy's Price Impact
Sell's Price Impact
Single

Commissions

MEAN

-38.69

Multip
le
-76.02

STD

31.85

42.76

30

45.25

11.28

MIN

-188.74

-237.8

-174.21

-242.7

-77.7

MAX

83.21

104.34

121.36

87.39

0
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Single

Multiple

-17.83

-53.74

-20.24

Table 1
Descriptive Statistics of Corruption, Government Involvement, Liquidity, Execution
Risk, Equity Held by Foreigners, Debt Held by Foreigners, and Control Variables
Panel D: Pearson Correlation Coefficients
All variables retain their definitions from Table 1. ***, **, and * represent 1, 5, and 10%
significance level respectively.
Corruption

Corruption
Corruption
Residual
Government
Involvement
Liquidity
Execution Risk
Equity Held by
Foreigners/GDP
Institutional
Buy
Volume/GDP
Debt Held by
Foreigners/GDP
Total Portfolio
Investment by
Foreigners/GDP

Corruption
Residual

Government
Involvement

Liquidit
y

Execution
Risk

Equity
Held by
Foreigne
rs/GDP

Institutio
nal Buy
Volume/
GDP

Debt
Held by
Foreigne
rs/GDP

1
0.59***

1

0.36***

0.02

1

-0.3***
0.32***
-0.17***

-0.17***
0.15***
-0.22***

-0.16***
0.24***
-0.13***

1
-0.4***
0.10***

1
0.10***

1

-0.41***

-0.09***

-0.12***

0.10***

-0.11***

0.04**

1

-0.18***

-0.19***

-0.12***

0.11***

0.11***

0.98***

0.03

1

-0.18***

-0.21***

-0.13***

0.11***

0.11***

0.99***

0.03*

0.99***

In Table 2, we divide our sample into two subgroups based on the level of
Corruption, using the median value of corruption as the cut-off point. Liquidity,
Execution Risk, and Institutional Buy Volume differences between high and low
corruption groups are −29.76 bps, 50.35 bps, and -16.23%, respectively. Stocks from
countries in the high corruption group have worse Liquidity and higher Execution Risk.
Countries in the high corruption group also have less Foreign Equity, Debt, and Portfolio
Investments, and Institutional Buy Volume.
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Table 2
Effect of Country Level Corruption
The sample is divided into two subgroups. Equity Held by Foreigners, Debt Held by
Foreigners, Total Portfolio Investment by Foreigners, Institutional Buy Volume,
Liquidity, Execution Risk, and Corruption are defined in Table 1. Each country has one
observation for the entire sample period in this table. Means of the respective
conditioning variable in high and low subgroups are shown in the first column. We
winsorize the Liquidity and Execution Risk variables at the 1st and 99th percentile values
to eliminate any outliers. ***, **, and * represent 1, 5, and 10% significance level
respectively.
Effects of Corruption on Liquidity, Execution Risk, Equity Held by
Foreigners/GDP, and Debt Held by Foreigners/GDP
Corruption level

Average
Corruption
Value

Liquidity

Execution
Risk

Equity Held
by
Foreigners/
GDP

Institutional
Buy
Volume/GD
P

Debt Held
by
Foreigners
/GDP

Low Corruption
(N = 25)
High Corruption
(N = 24)

0.12

-54.1

160.01

137.43

20.88

180.24

Total
Portfolio
Investment
by
Foreigners
/GDP
317.51

0.28

-83.86

210.37

4.65

4.65

12.24

16.88

-29.76***

50.35***

-132.78

-16.23***

-168.01

-300.63

High minus Low

Figure 1 shows the relationship between Corruption, Liquidity, and Execution
Risk. As one can see, Liquidity deteriorates as Corruption in the country increases.
Liquidity depends mainly on local market makers and may therefore deteriorate linearly
in corruption. Execution Risk also increases as Corruption in the country increases.
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Liquidity and Execution Risk
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Corruption

Figure 1
Corruption, Execution Risk, and Liquidity
Corruption is the inverse of Corruption Perception Index. Liquidity is the sum of the median
brokerage commission for each country in basis points and the median value of market impact
measure in basis points. Negative values represent cash outflow. Execution Risk is the absolute
value of difference between 75th and 25th percentiles of total trading cost. All variables are
defined in Table 1.

Figure 2 shows the nonlinear effects of Corruption on Equity Held by Foreigners
and Institutional Buy Volume. Equity Held by Foreigners is very high with extremely
low levels of corruption. As noted earlier, a transparent environment may create a level
playing field where sophisticated foreign investors can thrive with high quality
fundamental research. Equity Held by Foreigners decreases sharply as corruption
increases. The flows then stabilize and even increase slightly for extremely high levels of
corruption. In this latter environment, anybody, including foreign institutional investors,
may readily influence the corrupt government officials. In sum, our summary statistics
and Figures 1 and 2 reveal statistically significant relationships in the hypothesized
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directions, on a univariate basis, between Corruption and key measures of the quality of a
nation’s financial markets.

77.00

64.00
56.00

63.00
56.00

48.00

49.00

40.00

42.00

32.00

35.00
28.00

24.00
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Corruption
Equity Held by Foreigners/GDP

Institutional Buy Volume/GDP

Figure 2
Corruption, Equity Held by Foreigners, and Institutional Buy Volume
Corruption is the inverse of Corruption Perception Index. Equity Held by Foreigners is equity
ownership of foreigners divided by GDP as a percentage. Institutional Buy Volume / GDP is the
cumulative value of shares traded that were designated as buy orders, expressed as a percentage
of GDP. All variables are defined in Table 1.

B. Regression results including non-linear effects

Next, we test our hypothesis in a multivariate setting, In Table 3, the dependent
variable in the first four columns is Liquidity and two of the key explanatory variables
are the linear and squared forms of corruption. These variables try to capture any possible
linear and non-linear relationships between corruption and liquidity. In all four
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Institutional Buy Volume/GDP

Equity Held by Foreigners/GDP

70.00

specifications of Liquidity in Table 3, the coefficient of the linear corruption variable is
negative and significant but the squared form of corruption is insignificant. Thus,
increased corruption is associated with lower levels of Liquidity in a monotonic, linear
fashion. We also find that another explanatory variable of interest, government
involvement, affects liquidity adversely, although it is statistically significant only in the
fourth specification reported in Table 3.
In the final four columns of Table 3, we repeat our analysis with Execution Risk
as the dependent variable. In all but the fourth specification, we can see that more
corruption coincides with higher execution risk in a significant manner. The results for
Liquidity and Execution Risk regressions remain the same when we exclude countries
with many observations (trades) such as U.S., United Kingdom, and Japan. We also lose
some observations in some specifications because the government involvement variable
and other indices are not available for all countries.

28

Table 3
Deterioration in Liquidity and Execution Risk due to Corruption at the Country Level
The dependent variables are Liquidity and Execution Risk. Corruption, and Government Involvement are the key explanatory variables.
Control variables are motivated by Eleswarapu and Kumar (2006) and others mentioned below. All those variables are defined in Table 1.
Buy and Multi-Day are indicator variables for the direction and execution length of the institutional trading order. Stock market Turnover
is defined as ratio of the value of total shares traded to average real market capitalization and is obtained from Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and
Levine’s (2010) World Bank Database. The logarithm of nominal dollar denominated GDP in 2008 is from IMF’s World Economic
Outlook Database. Number of exchanges within the country are counted from the Handbook of World Stock, Derivative, and Commodity
Exchanges. Insider trading rules index, Volume manipulation rules index, and Price manipulation rules index are from Cumming, Johan,
and Li (2011). Political constraints (POLCON-III) from Henisz (2002) measures the feasibility of policy changes within a country. The
score ranges from 0 (total political discretion) to 1 (a change in current policies is infeasible). Short-selling feasibility is from Daouk, Lee,
and Ng (2006). Efficiency of judicial system is the assessment of the efficiency and integrity of the legal environment as it affects business
and is scaled from 0 to 10. A lower score represents lower efficiency level, as noted in La Porta et al. (1998). The Accounting standards
variable is an index scaled from 0 to 100 and lower scores indicate weaker accounting standards (La Porta et al., 1998). Anti-director
rights is an index that ranges from zero to six with higher values representing stronger rights (La Porta et al., 1998). Age of stock exchange
is the age of the leading stock exchange from Jain (2005). Cross-listing intensity is defined as the value weighted proportion of firms cross
listed as ADRs in the U.S. Its numerator is the market value (in millions U.S. $) of only the companies from a country that are cross-listed
as ADRs in U.S. and the denominator of this variable is market capitalization of all listed companies (in millions US$) for that country
from Datastream. Our list of cross-listed firms is obtained from the Bank of New York Mellon website at
http://www.adrbnymellon.com/dr_directory.jsp for the beginning of each year and we obtain the firms’ total market value from
Datastream. Volatility is the standard deviation of the stock market return calculated by using Datastream and the World Federation of
Exchanges database. Legal origins are dummy variables for French, German, and Scandinavian civil laws as well as English common law,
and are abstracted from La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1997). Standard errors are clustered by country and year
following Petersen (2009). We winsorize Liquidity and Execution Risk variables at the 1st and 99th percentile values to eliminate any
outliers. The results are robust to the inclusion of outliers.
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Dependent variable

Intercept
Corruption
Corruption2
Government involvement
Buy
Multi-Day
Turnover
LOG(GDP)
Number of exchanges
Insider trading rules index
Volume manipulation rules
index
Price manipulation rules
index
POLCON-III
Short selling feasibility
Efficiency of judicial
system
Accounting standards
Anti-director rights
Age of stock exchange
Cross-listing intensity
Volatility
French legal origin
German legal origin
Scandinavian legal origin
R2
N

Liquidity

Liquidity

Liquidity

Liquidity

[1]

[2]

[3]

[4]

[5]

[6]

[7]

[8]

-38.05***
-149.04***

-31.23***
-218.52***

-14.13
-198.27**

52.79
-415.48*

126.62***
308.89***

94.02***
640.53***

54.32*
829.43***

131.85*
277.86

143.07

100.51
-0.46
-24.30***
-36.18***
-0.05
3.25*
-1.54***

549.84
-1.05***
-25.84***
-37.99***
0.01
3.31*
-1.69**
0.66

-682

-1018.79**
1.64***
-2
86.01***
0.03
-6.16
0.43

-181.5
2.43***
-4.78
87.99***
-0.04
-11.92***
1.15
-2.27

0.09
3140

0.09
3140

0.34
2573

***, **, and * represent 1, 5, and 10% significance level respectively.

30

Execution Execution Execution Execution
Risk
Risk
Risk
Risk

6.86

13.31

-0.65
-5.57
-18.86***

-3
16.38
13.69**

1.92
-0.46*
-5.18**
0.02
-0.1
-22.27
4.21
-8
-12.78

-8.92***
0.68
0.72
-0.01
0.2
746.73***
-23.35*
-3.43
21.6

0.46
1892

0.1
3143

0.11
3143

0.41
2575

0.63
1877

Although our empirical results up until now have been focused on country level
effects, we also examine how corruption in business dealings can have a major impact on
individual firms. In this way, we can see if our country level results are corroborated at
the microscopic, firm level. In addition, this type of additional analysis can help inform
our understanding of how firm-specific decisions, particularly involving foreign dealings,
can impact a firm’s market value and liquidity. In Table 4 of Models [1], [2], and [3], the
dependent variable is our firm level measure of Liquidity. More negative values represent
higher trading costs or lower liquidity while higher numbers imply better liquidity. The
variable of interest in these regressions is labeled as Post-Corruption. This variable is
equal to one for the entire sample period after the corruption case was filed (i.e., days +2
to +90) and equal to zero before the filing date for the corruption case. In this context,
the announcement date is the day that the DOJ’s penalty is publicly revealed based on the
Lexis-Nexis and DOJ databases.14 The Post-Corruption variable is negative and
statistically significant at 10%. Liquidity of the firm’s stock decreases by about 44 basis
points per transaction after the corruption cases were filed. In Models [4], [5], and [6] of
Table 4, we analyze the impact of firm level corruption on Execution Risk. The PostCorruption variable is positive and statistically significant at 5% and indicates that the
firm’s order execution risk increases by 74.81 in basis points after the corruption cases
were filed. We also analyze the impact of firm level corruption on the firm’s equity
investment. In Model [7], the dependent variable is Buy Shares / Shares Outstanding %

14

We focus on actual DOJ penalties rather than announcements of preliminary DOJ investigations
into possible misconduct because an actual penalty is a much clearer signal of wrongdoing and thus should
lead to more accurate estimates of corruption’s direct impact on firm value.
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and the Post-Corruption variable is negative and statistically significant at 1% and thus
investors’ buying interest, as measured by Buy Shares / Shares Outstanding %, decreases
by 0.0186% after the corruption cases were filed.15 We also checked whether our sample
firms have restatements during our study period. We found that those firms did not have
any restatement. Thus, our results are not affected by the restatement effect as suggested
by Karpoff, Lee, and Martin (2012).

15

Eight of our FCPA cases in the sample are related to the Iraq Oil-For-Food scandal. Since these
eight cases may be related to, in effect, just one event corresponding to this scandal, we check any lack of
independence due to such a situation by clustering the standard errors not only by year but also by an Iraq
Oil-For-Food dummy, as described in Appendix I. Using these clustered standard errors, the statistical
significance of our results remains the same (results are available upon request).
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Table 4
Further Evidence on Deterioration in Liquidity: Firm Level Analysis of the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
The dependent variables are Liquidity, Execution Risk, and Buy Shares/Shares Outstanding %. Liquidity is the product of minus one and total trading
cost, which is defined as the sum of the brokerage commission and market impact measure in basis points. More negative values represent higher
trading cost or lower liquidity while higher numbers imply better liquidity. Market impact measure is calculated as: Price Impact = (Execution Price –
Open of the Day Price) / Open of the Day Price * Trade Indicator. The results remain the same when we use Prior Day Close Price as an alternative
benchmark. Execution Risk is the standard deviation of institutional trading cost (our liquidity measure) following Anand, Puckett, Irvine, and
Venkataraman (2010) in basis points. Standard deviation is calculated daily. In other words, we take the standard deviation of liquidity measure of all
individual transactions for that firm for that particular day. Regressions from Model [1] to Model [6] are in transaction (trade) level. Buy Shares/Shares
Outstanding % is daily total shares bought divided by shares outstanding in percentage. Post-Corruption variable is equal to one for the entire sample
period after the corruption case was filed or equal to zero before the filing date for the corruption case. Firm size is market capitalization in thousands of
dollars. Volume is total number of shares of a stock traded on that day. Market Return is the CRSP Equal-Weighted daily return. Buy is an indicator
variable for the direction. Return % is the daily return for the stock (expressed in percentage). Trend is a time trend equal to 1 for the year 2000, 2 for
year 2001 etc. Standard errors are clustered by firm and year following Petersen (2009).
Dependent variable

Intercept
Post-Corruption
Ln (Firm Size)
1/Price
Ln (Volume)
Volatility
Buy
Market Return (CRSP Equal)
Return %
Trend
R2
N

Liquidity

Liquidity

Liquidity

Execution
Risk

Execution
Risk

Execution
Risk

Buy
Shares/Shares
Outstanding %

[1]

[2]

[3]

[4]

[5]

[6]

[7]

-525.808***

-538.441***

-539.675***

368.232***

367.208***

367.434***

0.0629***

-44.769*

-43.957*

-43.18*

75.025**

74.8**

74.814**

-0.0186***

0.334

-6.277

-8.554

-1321.541***

-1562.155***

-1573.08***

9.031

11.97
15.732**

15.628**

48.837***

48.699***

-72.726***

-72.721***

-72.729***

-15.437
47.681***

-252.313
0.0009
49.871***

48.744***

48.219***

-14.798***

-14.826***

-14.835***

0.0021**

0.005

0.005

0.005

0.001

0.001

0.001

0.002

5566169

5566169

5566169

92872

92872

92872

49893

***, **, and * represent 1, 5, and 10% significance level respectively.
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One potential concern with any empirical analysis is the endogeneity of one or
more of the explanatory variables. Although one of our main hypotheses is that
corruption-free environments attract foreign equity investment, it is also possible that
prosperity can reduce corruption. Thus, to understand the direction of causality, Table 5
reports bi-directional Granger causality tests between yearly changes in corruption (Δ
Corruption i,t) and changes in Equity Held by Foreigners scaled by GDP (Δ Equity Held
by Foreigners / GDP i,t). The dependent variable in the first column is the yearly change
in Equity Held by Foreigners / GDP for a country. The dependent variable in the second
column is the yearly change in corruption for a country. This table shows evidence of
one-way Granger causality where corruption lowers future foreign equity investment
inflow, while there is no evidence of foreign equity investment having any significant
impact on future corruption.
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Table 5
Country Level Granger Causality Test
This table reports Granger causality tests between yearly changes in corruption (Δ
Corruptioni,t is defined as Corruptioni,t minus Corruptioni,t-1) and yearly changes in Equity
Held by Foreigners/GDP (Δ (Equity Held by Foreigners/GDP) i,t). The test is performed
from 2001 to 2009. We test the null hypothesis that Corruption does not Granger-cause
Foreign Equity Investment and then whether Foreign Equity Investment does not
Granger-cause Corruption. The dependent variable in the first column is the yearly
change in Equity Held by Foreigners/GDP for a country. The dependent variable in the
second column is the yearly change in corruption for a country. Statistical significance is
based on heteroscedasticity-consistent standard error.
Dependent variable

Δ (Equity Held by
Foreigners/GDP) i,t

Intercept
Δ Corruption i,t

Δ Corruption i,t

[1]

[2]

3.79

0.00155**

-205.93*

Δ (Equity Held by Foreigners/GDP) i,t

-0.00000251

R2
0.0005
0.0005
N
295
295
***, **, and * represent 1, 5, and 10% significance level respectively.

In Table 6, we examine the impact of corruption and government involvement on
foreign equity, debt, and portfolio investments by using Equity Held by Foreigners,
Institutional Buy Volume, Debt Held by Foreigners, and Total Portfolio Investment as
our dependent variables. The linear corruption variable in these specifications is negative
and statistically significant at 1% while the positive and significant squared form of
corruption captures the non-linear relationship between corruption and foreign equity,
debt, and portfolio investments. These results are consistent with our hypothesis H2a that
equity, debt, and portfolio flows are very high with extremely low levels of corruption,
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decrease sharply as corruption increases, and then the flows stabilize and even increase
slightly for very high levels of corruption. We find a similar reverse J-shaped pattern
when we use the alternative foreign equity investment measure based on Ancerno’s
buying volume.
The economic significance of the coefficients can be understood by computing
their marginal effects for the observed range of corruption values. For example, if Chile
reduces its high corruption level from 0.14 to the corruption level of Canada (0.12), Chile
can increase its foreign equity investment by 6.20% of GDP (computed as follows from
Model [3] in Table 6: −500.27 x (0.12−0.14) + 730.97 x (0.122 − 0.142). Additionally, the
indifference point for corruption is 0.342 (computed by setting the first order derivative
from Model [3] in Table 6 equal to zero: -500.27 + 2 x 730.97 x C = 0). We also form a
sample excluding tax havens such as to analyze the impact of corruption on equity and
portfolio inflow. For the sample excluding tax havens, the -279.55*** for the linear
corruption variable and 392.78*** for the squared form of corruption term compared to 500.27*** and 730.97***, respectively, reported for the full sample in Table 6 of Model
[3].
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Table 6
Effects of Country Level Corruption on Equity, Debt, and Total Portfolio Investments by Foreigners
The dependent variables are Equity Held by Foreigners, Institutional Buy Volume, Debt Held by Foreigners, and Total Portfolio
Investment by Foreigners. Equity Held by Foreigners, Institutional Buy Volume, Corruption, and Government Involvement are defined in
Table 1. POLCON-III, Efficiency of judicial system, Insider trading rules index, and Legal origins are defined in Table 3. Annual market
returns for each country are calculated using the MSCI Total Return Indexes (in U.S. $) from 2001 to 2009. Since MSCI indexes are
unavailable for Iceland, Luxembourg, and Venezuela during our study period, alternative market returns are calculated for those countries
using Datastream and the World Federation of Exchanges databases. Standard errors are clustered by country and year following Petersen
(2009). Models [1], [2], [3], [5], and [6] are from CPIS dataset while Model [4] is from Ancerno dataset.
Dependent variable

Intercept
Corruption
Corruption 2
Government involvement
POLCON-III
Efficiency of judicial system
Insider trading rules index
French legal origin
German legal origin
Scandinavian legal origin
Market return(t)

Equity Held by
Foreigners/GDP

Equity Held by
Foreigners/GDP

Equity Held by
Foreigners/GDP

Institutional Buy
Volume/GDP

Debt Held by
Foreigners/GDP

Total
Portfolio
Investment by
Foreigners/G
DP

[1]

[2]

[3]

[4]

[5]

[6]

176.68***
-532.62***

111.44***
-618.44***
857.14***
-0.78**

105.22***
-500.27***
730.97***
-0.6***
-32.81***
1.41
-4.14**
-10.13
-10.15
-7.89
3.73

23.97***
-176.22***
268.5***
0.08
-15.85**
1.48**
2.27**
0.31
9.43
-6.86
-1.49

96.64***
-586.13***
753.90***
-1.29***
-25.20
3.44**

226.42***
-998.46***
1415.67***
-2.00***
-79.46***
4.97*
-13.93**
-20.46
-9.15
-9.83
4.9

15.79
8.87
-17.57

R2

0.03

0.05

0.32

0.31

0.19

0.24

N

402

345

224

151

269

221

***, **, and * represent 1, 5, and 10% significance level respectively.
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In Table 7, we conduct a regression analysis for the equity cost of capital based on
our sample countries. We use a measure of an expected return as a dependent variable by
collecting the monthly Excess return over T-bill (ERT) from Datastream. The coefficient
of the Corruption variable is 61.577 and statistically significant at 5%. We also observe a
statistically significant non-linear relation between corruption and the cost of equity
capital, as can be seen by the significant negative parameter estimate for the Corruption2
variable. Thus, we find that a higher level of corruption is typically associated with an
increase in the cost of equity at the country level, with the highest levels for this cost
estimate occurring at a corruption level of 0.29 (i.e., around the levels found in Mexico,
Morocco, and Peru).
The economic significance of effects of corruption on cost of capital is also
substantial. For example, if Chile reduces its high corruption level from 0.14 to the
corruption level of Canada (0.12), Chile can reduce its annualized cost of equity capital
by 9.02% (computed as follows from Model [1] in Table 7: {(61.577 x (0.12−0.14) −
92.237 x (0.122 − 0.142)}*12. One may argue that a high cost of equity may be the result
of potentially high growth opportunities in corrupt countries. To address this point, we
use the three Fama-French factors, as well as the UMD momentum factor in order to
control for country level differences in growth, average firm size, and prior stock return
performance (above and beyond unobservable country level fixed effects). The results
show that a high cost of equity is primarily driven by greater systematic risk (as measured
by beta) and that high growth opportunities (e.g., as proxied by a negative parameter
estimate for the HML factor) do not appear to have a significant effect).
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Table 7
Effects of Corruption on the Cost of Equity Capital at the Country Level
We conduct a regression analysis where the dependent variable is the cost of capital for
our sample countries. The main explanatory variables, Corruption and Government
Involvement, are defined in Table 1. The proxy for cost of equity capital is the excess
return over T-bill (ERT). Excess return in U.S. dollars is defined as the raw return from
the country’s stock market index minus the one month U.S. T-bill rate (in percentage
form). The data on raw return at monthly frequency is obtained from Datastream country
indices section from 2001 to 2009. We compute Excess world return by subtracting the
risk-free rate from the gross world market return (in percentage). Based on Fama and
French (1993) three-factor model, HML is the spread in returns between portfolios of
value and growth stocks. SMB is the spread in returns between portfolios of small and
large size stocks. UMD is the spread in returns between portfolios of previous winner and
loser stocks. Standard errors are clustered by country and year following Petersen
(2009).
Dependent variable

Excess
return over
t-bill (ERT)
[1]

Excess
return over
t-bill (ERT)
[2]

Corruption

61.577**

69.098**

Corruption 2
Government involvement
Excess world return
HML
SMB
UMD
Country Fixed Effects Dummies

-92.237**

-104.974**
0.098*
1.115***
0.095*
0.052
0.032
Yes

1.133***
0.06
0.058
0.035*
Yes

R2
0.430
0.39
N
4626
3858
***, **, and * represent 1, 5, and 10% significance level respectively.

Beyond the country level analysis noted above, we also analyze the relation
between a firm’s cost of equity capital and the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act in the
period before and after each firm’s corruption event in a multivariate regression setting.
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Following the method in Jain (2005), we divide the sample into 3 periods: 1) a preannouncement period that produces the benchmark period cost of capital, 2) an
announcement period (or a valuation adjustment period) that controls for the immediate
reaction to the news of FCPA settlement, and 3) a post-announcement treatment period
which provides the new cost of capital after the corruption news has been fully
assimilated in the market.
We expect that a DOJ corruption investigation leads to an increase in the cost of
capital or future returns required by investors. Furthermore, we exclude the valuation
adjustment period between the benchmark and treatment periods from the regression
dataset (i.e., we remove the announcement period and analyze it separately). An increase
in required future returns in the post-announcement treatment period implies that the
firm’s stock price should immediately decline upon the corruption-related announcement
in the valuation adjustment period, even if the future cash flows are expected to remain
unchanged. Thus, the announcement period must be separated from the comparison
periods for the cost of capital before and after the corruption investigation. We use daily
returns of the firm in excess of the risk free rate (expressed in percentage form) as the
dependent variable in Model [1] of Table 8. Days -1, 0, and + 1 are excluded from the
regression as the announcement period, leaving only the periods before and after the
corruption for cleaner comparisons.
The Post-Corruption variable has a coefficient of 0.101 and statistically
significant at 5%. As expected, higher firm level corruption increases the firm’s cost of
equity capital.16 The parameter estimate of 1.265 for market risk factor suggests that

16

Note that we do not test for nonlinear effects in this model since we cannot construct a nonlinear
variant form of the Post-Corruption dummy variable.
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firms indicted under the FCPA are likely to be high beta companies and thus they may
take greater risks than the average firm. The pressure on high beta firms to generate
significant new earnings may encourage those firms to adopt aggressive business
practices such as bribing foreign officials.
For the valuation analysis at the time of the announcement of the FCPA
enforcement action, we use daily stock returns in excess of the risk-free rate for the
benchmark period, as well as over the three days surrounding this news (i.e., [-1, +1] in
Model [2]). The Announcement Effect variable is -0.391 and statistically significant at
5% and indicates an immediate negative reaction to the FCPA by the firm’s equity
investors. Taken together, the results for Model [1] show that investors do require a
higher return on equity capital for a firm that receives an enforcement action while Model
[2] indicates that the short-term reaction is negative as investors adjust their valuation of
the firm’s equity downward. We run the regressions with Post-Corruption variable and
Financial Penalties / Market Cap together, Post-Corruption variable still remains
significant but Financial Penalties / Market Cap is insignificant. Thus, the event of
corruption rather than amount of penalties is more important.
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Table 8
Further Evidence: Firm Level Cost of Equity Capital and the U.S. Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act
In Model [1] we assess the changes in the firms cost of capital. The dependent variable is
the daily return of the firm in excess of the risk free rate (expressed in percentage).
Sample period includes period of [+2, +90] days after the announcement when the postcorruption dummy is set equal to 1 as well as the benchmark period of [-90,-2] before the
announcement when the post-corruption dummy is set to 0. In model [2] we use excess
daily return over three days valuation adjustment period [-1, +1] as the dependent
variable. Mkt-rf is market return in excess of the return on the 1-month U.S. Treasury bill
return. HML is the spread in returns between portfolios of value and growth stocks. SMB
is the spread in returns between portfolios of small and large size stocks. UMD is the
spread in returns between portfolios of previous winner and loser stocks. Days -1, 0, and
+ 1 are excluded in the regression in Model [1]. Standard errors are clustered by firm and
year following Petersen (2009).
Dependent variable

Post-Corruption
Announcement Effect
Mkt-rf
HML
SMB
UMD
Firm Fixed Effects
Dummies

Cost of Equity Capital
(Sample includes post
corruption period and
benchmark period)

Valuation adjustment
period [-1,+1] and
benchmark period

[1]

[2]

0.101**
1.265***
-0.049
-0.025
-0.05

-0.391**
1.304***
-0.088
0.003
0.03

Yes

Yes

R2
0.4768
0.533
N
4780
2484
***, **, and * represent 1, 5, and 10% significance level respectively.
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C. Simultaneous Equations Approach to identify the effects of Corruption and
Government involvement on Liquidity, Execution Risk, Equity Held by Foreigners, Debt
Held by Foreigners, and Total Portfolio Investment by Foreigners

At the country level, Corruption and Government involvement in the Financial
Sector can be highly correlated with each other and other macro-institutional variables
such as the efficiency of judicial system and legal origins. These potential simultaneity
and multi-collinearity problems can lead to incorrect inferences about our parameter
estimates. To mitigate this problem, we conduct a two-step regression in order to
orthogonalize the key variables of interest. In the first step, we regress Corruption on
Government Involvement in the financial sector, Efficiency of judicial system, French
legal origin, German legal origin, and Scandinavian legal origin, with English common
law as the base case, and store the residuals from this regression, vi,t. Model structure and
variable choice is based on La Porta et al. (1999), Shleifer and Vishny (1994), Tanzi
(1995), Johnson, Kaufman, and Zoido-Lobaton (1998), La Porta et al. (2002), and La
Porta et al. (1999):
Corruptionit = f1(Government involvement, Efficiency of judicial system, French legal
origin, German legal origin, Scandinavian legal origin) + vi,t

(3)

Government involvementit = f2(Corruption, POLCON-III, French legal origin, German
legal origin, Scandinavian legal origin) + ui,t
Then, in the second step, we use vi,t as an alternative proxy for Corruption’s
incremental effect on Liquidity, Execution Risk, and Foreign Equity, and Debt
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(4)

ownership. Similarly, we regress Government involvement in the financial sector on
Corruption, POLCON-III, French legal origin, German legal origin, Scandinavian legal
origin, with English common law as the base case, and use the residuals from this
regression, ui,t, as an alternative proxy for Government involvement’s effect on Liquidity,
Execution Risk, Foreign Equity and Debt ownership. In this way, Corruption and
Government involvement in the Financial Sector data are orthogonalized and thus free of
any collinearity between each other and the macro-institutional variables. The
incremental effect of residual or orthogonalized corruption on Liquidity, Execution Risk,
Equity Held by Foreigners, Debt Held by Foreigners, and Total Portfolio Investment by
Foreigners is estimated via a panel data set as follows:
Liquidityi,t = f3(Corruption residual, Government involvement residual, Control
variables) +

(5)

Execution Riski,t = f4(Corruption residual, Government involvement residual, Control
variables) +

(6)

Equity Held by Foreignersi,t = f5(Corruption residual, Government involvement residual,
Control variables) +

(7)

Debt Held by Foreignersi,t = f6(Corruption residual, Government involvement residual,
Control variables) +

(8)

Total Portfolio Investment by Foreignersi,t = f7(Corruption residual, Government
involvement residual, Control variables) +

(9)

where,
Corruption Residual = vi,t from Equation (3), and
Government Involvement Residual = ui,t from Equation (4).
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The regression specifications noted above all include dummy variables to control
for unobserved regional differences and we cluster standard errors by country and year,
as recommended in Petersen (2009). Liquidity and Execution Risk variables are also
winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile values to eliminate any outliers, although we also
find that the results are robust to the inclusion of outliers. In Regression [1] of Panel A in
Table 9, the dependent variable is Corruption and the R2 of the regression is 0.655. In
Regression [2] within the same panel, the dependent variable is Government involvement
and its R2 is 0.183. The residuals from the first-stage regressions reported in Panel A are
then used along with Equations (5) – (9) to generate the second-stage parameter estimates
found in Panel B of Table 9.
In Panel B of Table 9, the dependent variable in the first column’s regression is
Liquidity. The corruption residual’s parameter estimate in this column is -77.03 and
statistically significant at 5%. Thus, greater corruption is related to decreases in liquidity,
over and above any joint effects of corruption and other institutional variables on
liquidity. The Government involvement residual’s coefficient is -1.40 and statistically
significant at 1%. In addition, the coefficient of Buy orders is -25.33 and the coefficient
of Multi-Day orders is -38.51, both of which are significant at 1%. Thus, both buy and
multi-day orders are associated with lower Liquidity. Since we use orthogonalized
residuals as proxies for corruption and government involvement, we do not include a
squared form of these residuals in our regressions because squaring the residual values
removes an important attribute of these variables: their potential to have either a negative
or positive sign.
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In the second regression in Panel B of Table 9, the dependent variable is
Execution Risk and the Government involvement residual is 2.20 and significant at 1%.
Thus, Government involvement is positively related to Execution Risk for institutions,
over and above their joint effects with other institutional variables.
The dependent variable in the third regression is Equity Held by Foreigners / GDP
and the corruption residual has a statistically significant coefficient of -133.56. In
addition, the Government involvement residual has a coefficient of -1.04, which is also
significant at the 1% level. The dependent variable in the fourth regression is Debt Held
by Foreigners / GDP and the corruption residual has a statistically significant coefficient
of -163. The dependent variable in the fifth regression is Total Portfolio Investment by
Foreigners / GDP and the corruption residual has a statistically significant coefficient of 303.83. Thus, increased corruption and greater government involvement confirm our
earlier results which indicate that these variables are associated with lower levels of
foreign equity, debt, and portfolio investments. The dependent variables for models [1]
and [2] are from the Ancerno dataset while Models [3], [4], and [5] are from the CPIS
dataset.
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Table 9
Simultaneous Equations Approach to assess Country Level Corruption
Panel A: Stage I
Corruption and Government Involvement are first orthogonalized and cleaned of any
multi-collinearity with macro-institutional variables in the regressions below:
Corruptionit = f1(Government Involvement, Efficiency of Judicial system, French legal origin,
German legal origin, Scandinavian legal origin) + vi,t
Government Involvement it = f2(Corruption, French legal origin, German legal origin,
Scandinavian legal origin, POLCON-III) + ui,t
Variable definitions are the same as those in Tables 1 and 3. Statistical significance is based on White’s
heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors.

Dependent variable

Intercept
Corruption
Government involvement
Efficiency of judicial system
French legal origin
German legal origin
Scandinavian legal origin
POLCON-III

Corruption Government
Involvement
[1]
[2]
0.442***
0.003***
-0.032***
-0.01
-0.026***
-0.019***

2.75
19.812***

2.825***
3.86**
-0.001
-8.345

R2
0.655
0.183
N
133
133
***, **, and * represent 1, 5, and 10% significance level respectively.
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Table 9 Simultaneous Equations Approach … continued
Panel B: Stage II
Orthogonalized Nonlinear Corruption (vi,t) and Government Involvement (ui,t) variables from Panel A are used in Panel B.
After estimating Equation (3) and (4), the system of equations for Liquidity, Execution Risk, Equity Held by Foreigners/GDP,
Debt Held by Foreigners/GDP, and Total Portfolio Investment by Foreigners/GDP can be estimated via a panel data set as
follows:
Liquidityi,t = f3(Corruption Residual, Government Involvement Residual, Control variables) +
Execution Riski,t = f3(Corruption Residual, Government Involvement Residual, Control variables) +
Equity Held by Foreigners/GDPi,t = f3(Corruption Residual, Government Involvement Residual, Control variables) +
Debt Held by Foreigners/GDPi,t = f3(Corruption Residual, Government Involvement Residual, Control variables) +
Total Portfolio Investment by Foreigners/GDPi,t = f3(Corruption Residual, Government Involvement Residual, Control
variables) +
Variable defitions are the same as those on Tables 1, 3, and 6. Standard errors are clustered by country and year following
Petersen (2009). We winsorize Liquidity and Execution Risk variables at the 1st and 99th percentile values to eliminate any
outliers. The results are robust to the inclusion of outliers. Models [1], [2], and [3] are from different datasets. Models [1] and
[2] are from Ancerno while Models [3], [4], and [5] are from CPIS dataset. ***, **, and * represent 1, 5, and 10% significance
level respectively.
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Dependent variable

Liquidity

Execution
Risk

Equity Held by
Foreigners/GDP

Debt Held by
Foreigners/GDP

[1]

[2]

[3]

[4]

Total Portfolio
Investment by
Foreigners/GDP
[5]

13.7

206.64***

-2.5

-55.22***

-6.18

Corruption residual

-77.03**

61.51

-133.56***

-163.00***

-303.83***

Government involvement residual

-1.4***

2.2***

-1.04***

-1.91***

-3.05***

-33.89***

-26.13

-76.16**

6.92***

12.08***

17.3***

Intercept

Buy

-25.33***

-4.21

Multi-Day
Age of stock exchange

-38.51***
0

87.54***
0.02

Turnover

0.06**

-0.05

POLCON-III

-12.19

30.74

5.57***

-15.53***

Short selling feasibility
Cross-listing intensity

-11.43***
-0.17

-2.15
0.47**

Number of exchanges

-3.53***

1.67

4.8**

-8.62*

-1.2***

0.65

Price manipulation rules index

-0.16

-5.47

Volume manipulation rules index

-2.36

23.78

Insider trading rules index

-1.26

-2.95

Anti-director rights

2.25

-8.39**

Volatility

25.91

713.44***

LOG(GDP)

Efficiency of judicial system
Accounting standards

-4.32**

-14.37**

French legal origin

-17.85**

4.95

-15.37*

11.9

-33.5

German legal origin

-15.55***

-2.78

-8.28

11.73

-6.92

-1.29

8.41

0.72

-6.14

8.18

Scandinavian legal origin
Market return(t)
Regional dummies
2

R
N

3.38
Yes

Yes

0.49
1892

0.65
1869

0.29
224
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4.47

0.18
269

0.23
221

Overall, the above results provide support for both hypotheses H1a and H2a. For
example, the evidence related to Corruption support the “political” hypothesis because
corruption is negatively related to Liquidity, Foreign Equity, Debt, and Portfolio
Investments. The results pertaining to Government involvement also support the political
view via this variable’s positive relationship with Execution Risk and its inverse
relationship to Liquidity and Foreign Equity, Debt, and Portfolio Investments. Thus,
Government involvement increases a stock market’s order execution risk while also
reducing the market’s attractiveness to foreign investors. As noted above, these results
are robust to potential problems associated with simultaneity and multi-collinearity
between corruption, government involvement, and several other macro-institutional
variables.

V. Conclusion

We test the effects of corruption and government influence on financial
transactions, capital investment inflows, and cost of equity capital. The developmental
view on corruption suggests that corruption can have positive effects whereas the
political view states that corruption has negative effects. The trade-off between the
developmental and political aspects of corruption, as well as the differential abilities of
domestic and foreign institutional investors, potentially generate non-linear effects of
corruption that have not been previously explored in the literature. We test the competing
development and political views of corruption by examining a country level panel dataset
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containing corruption perceptions and by conducting a firm level event study surrounding
the public announcements of U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) violations.
We find that corruption decreases liquidity available to institutional traders and
discourages foreign portfolio investment inflows into the country. It increases investors’
order execution risks as well as corporations’ cost of equity capital. The effect of
corruption on foreign equity investment is nonlinear and reverse J-shaped, with
intermediate levels of corruption yielding the most negative effects on foreign portfolio
investment in our study of 49 countries (after controlling for several other macro-level
institutional variables). To measure the attractiveness of a nation’s equity markets to
foreign investors, we analyze the net capital investment in a country’s equity markets
using two alternative data sources, one is a survey dataset from the IMF and another is a
dataset of actual institutional buy trades from the data vendor, Ancerno. The effects of
corruption are evident in both institutional trading decisions and overall capital
formation.
In addition to the country level analysis of corruption discussed above, we
examine the effect of firm level corruption. Several Fortune 500 firms faced
investigations and enforcement actions by the U.S. Department of Justice under the
FCPA during the last decade. Firm level analysis of the U.S. FCPA violations reveals that
charges of corruption against a firm negatively affect its stock market liquidity and equity
investment while also increasing a stock’s order execution risk. Charges of corruption
also increase the firm’s cost of equity capital. These firm level findings are important
addition to the corruption literature that mainly focused on macroeconomic studies in the
past.
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We also ensure that the phenomena described above are truly driven by corruption
and not by other correlated macro-economic or institutional variables. To do so, we
conduct a two-stage regression where the effects of corruption and government
involvement are orthogonalized in the first stage regression via the inclusion of the
country’s efficiency of judicial system, the country’s legal origin, and several other
macro-level institutional variables as explanatory variables. In the second stage, we
observe that the residual, or incremental, effects of corruption significantly explain stock
market liquidity and foreign portfolio investment inflows into the country.
Our findings on corruption’s pervasive effects on investors and corporations
suggest that further research is warranted in areas of portfolio analysis and corporate
decision making, explicitly focusing on short term and long term consequences of
corruption and the regulatory fight against it.
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Appendix I
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and Related Enforcement Actions
Appendix I shows our sample firms that were indicted and are in our Ancerno and other datasets during 2000 to 2009. Public
announcement date for the corruption case from Lexis-Nexis is shown in the second column. The third column reports citations or
case name and number for each company. The fourth column shows regulatory action date. The fifth column shows Iraq Oil-For-Food
Scandal dummy which is equal to one if the corruption case is related to the scandal. The sixth column reports the provisions of the
FCPA that are violated by the firm. Financial penalties and permno of the indicted companies for those cases are shown in seventh and
eighth respectively.
Company
Public
Citation
Regulatory
Iraq
Violations
Financial
Permno
Name
Announce
Action
Oilof the
Penalties
ment
Date
ForFCPA
Food
Provisions
Scandal
ABB Ltd
7-Jun-04
U.S. v. ABB Vetco Gray, Inc., No.
6-Jul-04
0
Anti$16.4
88953
CR H-04-279 (S.D. Tex. 2004)
bribery
million
SEC v. ABB Ltd., 1:04-cv-01141
30-Nov-04
(D.D.C. 2004)
AGCO
30-Sep-09
U.S. v. AGCO Ltd., No. 1:09-cr30-Sep-09
1
Books
$20
77520
Corp
249-RJL (D.C.C. 2009)
and
million
records,
Internal
controls
SEC v. AGCO Corp., No. 1:09-cv30-Sep-09
1865-RMU (D.D.C. 2009)
Avery
12-Jan-09
SEC v. Avery Dennison Corp., No.
28-Jul-09
0
Books
$518,470
44601
Dennison
2:09-cv-5493 (C.D. Cal. 2009); In re
and
Corp
Avery Dennison Corp., SEC Admin.
records,
Proceeding No. 3-13564 (2009)
Internal
controls
Baker
12-Sep-01
U.S. v. Baker Hughes Services Int'l.,
11-Apr-07
0
Anti$44.1
75034
Hughes
Inc., No. 07-CR-00129 (S.D.Tex.
bribery,
million
Inc.
2007)
Books
and
records
S.E.C. v. Baker Hughes Inc. and Roy 26-Apr-07
Fearnley, No. 07-cv-1408 (S.D. Tex.
2007)
BellSouth
15-Jan-02
SEC v. BellSouth Corp., No. 0215-Jan-02
0
Books
$150,000
65883
Corp
0113 (N.D. Ga. 2002)
and
records,
Internal
controls
Chevron
14-NovUnited States v. Chevron Corp.
8-Nov-07
1
Books
$28
14541
07
and
million
records,
Internal
controls
SEC v. Chevron Corporation, Civil
14-Nov-07
Action No. 07 CIV 10299 (S.D.N.Y.
2007)
CNH
22-DecUnited States v. CNH Italia S.p.A.
22-Dec-08
1
Books
$17.8
84179
Global
08
and
million
NV
records,
Internal
controls
United States v. CNH France S.A.
22-Dec-08
SEC v. Fiat S.p.A. and CNH Global
22-Dec-08
N.V., No. 1:08-cv-02211 (D.D.C.
2008)
Diagnostic
20-MayU.S. v. DPC (Tianjin) Co. Ltd., No.
20-May0
Anti$4.8
29752
Products
05
2:05-cr-00482 (C.D. Cal. 2005)
05
bribery,
million
Corp
Books
and
records,
Internal
controls
In the Matter of Diagnostics
20-MayProducts Corporation, SEC
05
Administrative Proceeding File No.
3-11933 (2005)
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El Paso
Corp

19-Feb-07

Electronic
Data
Systems
Corp
Flowserve
Corp

25-Sep-07

Halliburton
Company

21-Feb-08

7-Feb-09
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U.S. v. El Paso Corporation
5-Feb-07
1
Books and
records,
Internal
controls
SEC v. El Paso Corporation, No.
7-Feb-07
07-CV-899 (S.D.N.Y. 2007)
SEC v. Chandramowli Srinivasan
25-Sep-07
0
Books and
records

U.S. v. Flowserve Corporation

21-Feb-08

SEC v. Flowserve Corporation, No.
1:08-cv-00294 (D.D.C. 2008)
U.S. v. Kellogg Brown & Root
LLC, No. 09-071 (S.D. Tex. 2009)

21-Feb-08

SEC v. Halliburton Company and
KBR, Inc., No. 4:09-cv-00399
(S.D. Tex. 2009)
In the Matter of Helmerich &
Payne, Inc., Respondent

11-Feb-09

30940

0

Antibribery,
Books and
records,
Internal
controls

$579
million

23819

30-Jul-09

0

Antibribery,
Books and
records,
Internal
controls
Books and
records,
Internal
controls
Books and
records,
Internal
controls

$1.3
million

32707

Not stated

88867

$6.7
million

12431

6-Feb-09

27-Sep-07

In re Immucor Inc. and Gioacchino
De Chirico, SEC Administrative
Proceeding File No. 3-12846

27-Sep-07

0

Ingersoll
Rand Co
Ltd.

31-Oct-07

U.S. v. Ingersoll-Rand Italiana
S.p.A., 1:07-cr-00294-RJL

31-Oct-07

1

U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission v. Ingersoll-Rand
Company Limited, 1:07cv-01955JDB
SEC v. International Business
Machines Corporation 00-Civ3040 D.D.C. Dec. 21, 2000
SEC v. ITT Corporation, No. 1:09cv-00272 (D.D.C. 2009)

31-Oct-07

11-Feb-09

Novo
Nordisk
AS

30-Mar-06

ScheringPlough
Corp

9-Jun-04

83596

$10.5
million

Immucor,
Inc

ITT Corp

$490,902

Books and
records,
Internal
controls

29-Jul-09

21-Dec-00

77481

1

Helmerich
& Payne
Inc.

IBM Corp

$2.2
million

21-Dec00

0

Books and
records

$300,000

12490

11-Feb-09

0

$1.7
million

12570

U.S. v. Novo Nordisk A/S, No. 0912C (RJL) (D. D.C. 2009)

11-May09

1

Books and
records,
Internal
controls
Books and
records,
Internal
controls

$9 million

63263

SEC v. Novo Nordisk A/S, No.
1:09-cv-00862 (D. D.C. 2009)
SEC v. Schering-Plough Corp., No.
04-0945, (D.D.C. 2004)

11-May09
9-Jun-04

$500,000

25013

58

0

Books and
records,
Internal
controls

Schnitzer
Steel
Industries
Inc.

13-Oct-06

Siemens AG
AD

6-Nov-08

Statoil ASA

11-Oct-06

Textron Inc.

23-Aug-07

The Dow
Chemical
Comp

15-Feb-07

Tyco
International
Ltd.

18-Apr-06

Wabtec
Corp

14-Feb-08

Willbros
Group Inc.

14-May-08
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United States v. SSI Int'l Far
16-Oct-06
0
Books
$7.5
East Ltd., Case 3:06-cr-00398and
million
KI (D. Or. Oct. 16, 2006)
records,
Internal
controls
In re Schnitzer Steel Industries
16-Oct-06
U.S. v. Siemens
12-Dec-08
0
Books
$800
Aktiengesellschaft, No. 1:08-crand
million
00367-RJL (D.D.C. 2008)
records,
Internal
controls
SEC v. Siemens
12-Dec-08
Aktiengesellschaft, No. 08-CV02167 (D.D.C. 2008)
U.S. v. Statoil, ASA, No. 1:0612-Oct-06
0
Anti$10.5
cr-00960-RJH-1 (S.D.N.Y.
bribery,
million
2006)
Books
and
records
In the Matter of Statoil, ASA,
13-Oct-06
No. 312453 (S.E.C. 2006)
United States v. Textron, Inc.
23-Aug-07
1
Anti$4.65
bribery,
million
Books
and
records,
Internal
controls
SEC v. Textron, Inc., No. 1:0723-Aug-07
cv-01505 (D.D.C. 2007)
SEC v. Dow Chemical Co., No.
13-Feb-07
0
Books
$325,000
07-CV-336 (D.D.C. 2007); In
and
the Matter of the Dow Chemical
records,
Co., Administrative Proceeding
Internal
No. 3-12567 (SEC Feb. 13,
controls
2007)
SEC v. Tyco International Ltd.,
13-Apr-06
0
Anti$50
No. 06-CV-2942 (S.D.N.Y.
bribery,
million
2006)
Books
and
records,
Internal
controls
U.S. v. Westinghouse Air Brake
14-Feb-08
0
Anti$689,000
Technologies Corporation
bribery,
Books
and
records,
Internal
controls
SEC v. Westinghouse Air Brake
14-Feb-08
Technologies Corporation, No.
08-CV-706, (E.D.Pa. 2008);
SEC v. Westinghouse Air Brake
Technologies Corporation, SEC
Adminstrative Proceeding File
No. 3-12957 (Feb. 14, 2008)
U.S. v. Willbros, Inc. and
14-May-08
0
Anti$22 million
Willbros International, Inc., No.
bribery,
4:08-cr-0287 (S.D. Tex. 2008)
Books
and
records
SEC v. Willbros Group, Inc., et
14-May-08
al., No. 4:08-cv-01494 (S.D.
Tex. 2008)
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79866

88935

89016

23579

20626

45356

81677

83834

ESSAY 2
Market Liquidity and Ambiguity: The Certification Role of Corporate Governance
I. Introduction

This paper empirically studies how firm-specific certification practices through
corporate governance can reduce perceived ambiguity and thus enhance liquidity of a
firm in the stock market. For purposes of this paper, we adopt the following definition of
ambiguity (or uncertainty); a situation in which both the outcome and its distributions are
unknown. This definition corresponds to what Knight (1921) would refer to as
uncertainty.1 An important development of recent research in finance contends that
uncertainty, in addition to risk (when outcome is unknown but the distribution of its
outcomes is known) should matter for the formation of asset prices and other corporate
decisions. For the sake of illustration, consider the 2008 credit crisis. During this period,
participants found that the valuation of mortgage-backed securities and collateralized
loan obligations had become very difficult. Accordingly, in the absence of price
formation, many participants were not willing to trade those assets. Further, given the
relative complexity of these products, market participants did not have a great deal of
information regarding the distribution of these assets payoffs, there were little trades in
those markets. Another example of an ambiguous environment would be Over the

1

Knight (1921, pg. 11) suggests that “Uncertainty must be taken in a sense radically distinct from the
familiar notion of Risk, from which it has never been properly separated. The term "risk," as loosely used in everyday
speech and in economic discussion, really covers two things which, functionally at least, in their causal relations to the
phenomena of economic organization, are categorically different. The essential fact is that "risk" means in some cases a
quantity susceptible of measurement, while at other times it is something distinctly not of this character; and there are
far-reaching and crucial differences in the bearings of the phenomenon depending on which of the two is really present
and operating. It will appear that a measurable uncertainty, or "risk" proper, as we shall use the term, is so far different
from an unmeasurable one that it is not in effect an uncertainty at all. We shall accordingly restrict the term
“uncertainty” to cases of the non-quantitative type.”
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Counter Markets such as Pink Sheet. Investor participations and trading volumes are
relatively lower in Pink Sheets than those at organized exchanges. Strict listing
requirements at organized exchanges help reduce ambiguity and, thus, increase
participations at those markets. Ellsberg (1961) shows risk-averse individuals show
preferences that distinguish between risk (with known probabilities) and ambiguity (with
unknown probabilities).
Easley and O’Hara (2010) posit that changing specific features of the
microstructure and certification could potentially reduce perceived ambiguity and serve
to increase participation by both investors and issuers.2 In their model, sophisticated
traders are viewed as expected utility maximizers with rational expectations, while
unsophisticated traders (ambiguity-averse traders) are viewed as rational traders facing
ambiguity about the payoffs to participating in the market. Theoretically, they show how
designing markets to reduce ambiguity can benefit investors through greater liquidity. 3
More specifically, Easley and O’Hara (2010) suggest that changes to trading practices,
trading rules, and market design can eliminate worst-case distributions of returns. At
market levels, microstructure features such as listing requirements, clearing and
settlement protocols, trade monitoring, best execution requirements, trading halts, and
circuit breaker rules can be modified as a means to reduce ambiguity and increase market
participation.

2

Uncertainty and ambiguity are interchangeably used in the literature and throughout the paper.

3
Ambiguity-averse investors do not act as if there is a single distribution of payoffs to assets; instead they act
as if there is set of distributions, all of which are possible, and do not have a prior over this set of distributions. These
traders are greatly influenced by the worst possible distribution of any portfolio that they contemplate. These cause
ambiguity-averse traders not to participate when the ambiguity, or uncertainty, in a market is large (Easley and O’Hara,
2010, p.1).
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In contrast to the cited studies that focus on differences in ambiguity due to legal
and regulatory environments, our study focuses on differences in ambiguity that can be
attributable to firm-level certification. This important dimension has not previously been
studied in the literature and is the primary contribution of the current study. Specifically,
we empirically examine how firm-specific certification through better internal corporate
governance practices can reduce perceived ambiguity and thus enhance liquidity in the
stock market.
Company-specific ambiguity can be reduced by firm-specific certification
services such as better corporate governance practices. Better corporate governance
practices include the following:


The Board of Directors is controlled by independent outside directors



There is an independent audit committee



The company has no poison pill



There are no conflict of interest among compensation committee members



Shareholders may call special meetings



The Board must consider shareholder proposals

Good corporate governance practices such as these help to prevent controlling
shareholders from expropriating a firm’s resources. Firm-specific certification provides a
level of assurance for ambiguity averse investors that the “worst cases,” which they fear,
will be less likely to happen. In a similar vein, Easley and O’Hara (2010) suggest that
certification rules out “blue sky” outcomes.
Until now, studies concerning the role of uncertainty in capital markets are few.
While regulators or exchanges can reduce uncertainty to an extent through imposing
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some of the corporate governance standards such as voting restrictions, the majority of
corporate governance standards cited can only be implemented through voluntary
adoption at the firm level.
However, implementing these corporate governance standards can be very costly
to firms. Recent evidence from the NYSE suggests that the increased compliance costs
associated with governance standards and other regulatory requirements has led to an
increased number of firms choosing to be delisted. Clearly, it is in the best interest of
exchanges, regulators, and firms to balance the cost and benefits of governance standards.
As there exists a large domain of corporate governance standards, it would be costly and
suboptimal for the firms to implement all of them. In this study, we identify the subset of
metrics among the universe of governance standards that can help the firms decrease
ambiguity, and thereby help to achieve desired benefits for the firm.
In addition, we hypothesize that the reduction in ambiguity can increase liquidity.
This proposition is not entirely original to our study. Easley and O’Hara (2009) posit that
regulation of unlikely events can moderate the effects of ambiguity and encourage
participation in financial markets. Further, this would generate welfare gains such as
lower risk premium or improved liquidity. There is also related literature on the positive
correlation between corporate governance and liquidity. Coffee (1991), for example,
argues that large investors have increasingly supported measures that improve internal
corporate governance because such measures also improve stock market liquidity (which
makes their exit less costly). Chung, Elder, Kim (2010) find that firms may alleviate
information-based trading and improve stock market liquidity by adopting corporate
governance standards that mitigate informational asymmetries. To our knowledge,
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however, the empirical relation between ambiguity and stock market liquidity has not yet
been established. The analysis of the relation is important because it could shed some
light on the channel through which a moderation of ambiguity affects shareholder wealth.
Using data from 2001-2007 for US firms, we test empirically whether corporate
governance standards help to reduce firm level ambiguity, and additionally whether the
reduction in ambiguity can be linked to positive welfare gains such as higher liquidity.
Our results suggest that better corporate governance does reduce firm-specific ambiguity.
We identify a subset of governance standards using methodology similar to Brown and
Caylor (2006). After identifying the subset of governance standards associated with a
reduction in ambiguity, we use these standards to construct two indices for each firm by
awarding one point for each governance standard that is met. We find that our
governance indices are negatively related to firm specific ambiguity. Our results are
robust to alternative measures of firm specific ambiguity, and remain significant after we
control for other determinants of ambiguity. Furthermore, a moderation in ambiguity is
associated with better liquidity of firms. A lower level of firm-specific ambiguity is
positively associated with measures of liquidity such as quoted spread and effective
spread, even after controlling for a large set of known determinants of liquidity.
This study is important for a number of reasons. First, it provides new empirical
evidence on the role of ambiguity in capital markets. It adds to our understanding of how
ambiguity can be moderated through firm-level certification practices. It highlights the
importance of a subset of corporate governance metrics that are directly related to a
reduction in ambiguity. In addition, our new findings of empirical relation between
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ambiguity and stock market liquidity are also important as they have the potential to
identify a mechanism by which moderation of ambiguity affects shareholder wealth.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II presents the detailed explanation of
the research questions and the empirical methodologies for the measures of ambiguity.
Section III describes our dataset and the construction of corporate governance indices.
Section IV discusses our empirical findings and Section V addresses additional
econometric issues. Section VI concludes the paper.

II.

Research Questions and Empirical Methodologies

A. Research Questions

While several papers in the literature have studied the importance of uncertainty in
asset pricing (i.e., Anderson et al., 2009), other implications of uncertainty in the
financial markets remain relatively unexplored. In this study, we investigate whether
better corporate governance can be used to reduce ambiguity, thereby improving liquidity
in securities. We examine the following two hypotheses.
H1: Firm-specific certification is significantly negatively related to ambiguity.
H2: Reduction in ambiguity is significantly positively related to participation and
liquidity in securities.
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B. Measures of Ambiguity (Uncertainty)

Despite the difficulty in measuring ambiguity or uncertainty, there are some
important works in the literature that have developed empirical measures of ambiguity.
Barron et al. (2009) separate analysts forecast dispersion into two components:
uncertainty and information asymmetry. They conclude that levels and changes in
dispersion reflect different underlying constructs. Specifically, levels of forecast
dispersion reflect uncertainty while changes in dispersion around earnings
announcements primarily reflect changes in information asymmetry. Following Barron
et al. (2009), our primary ambiguity measure is decomposed from forecast dispersion:
(1)
(2)
(3)
where,
D = forecast dispersion — that is, the sample variance of the individual forecasts (FCi)
around the mean forecast (

);

V = overall uncertainty — the mean of the squared differences between individual
analysts' forecasts (FCi) and reported earnings per share (EPS);
= lack of analysts' consensus, our proxy for information asymmetry;
SE = squared error in the mean forecast, measured as the difference between earnings per
share and the mean forecast, i.e.,

2

n = the number of individual forecasts.
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and

Following Barron et al. (2009), we scale UNCERTAINTY by the stock price
measured at the time of the forecast and we take the natural log of the variables. Barron et
al. (2009) provide two reasons for their use of the natural log of the variables. First,
dispersion equals the product of their proxies for uncertainty and information asymmetry,
that is,

. Thus, the log transformation results in a linear relation,

appropriate for OLS regressions. Second, dispersion and uncertainty are both highly
skewed and the log transformation greatly mitigates this problem. 4
For robustness, we also test our results by using three alternative ambiguity
proxies used in the literature (Atiase & Bamber, 1994; Avramov et al., 2009; Diether et
al., 2002; Johnson, 2004; Lustgarten & Mande, 1998; Thomas, 2002). We use three
closely related measures. Analysts Earning Forecast Dispersion is the dispersion of
earnings forecast estimates for the quarter, using data taken from the I/B/E/S database
(it) during the time period from 2001 to 2007. Analysts Earning Forecast Dispersion is
scaled by one of the following three variables: absolute value of the mean earnings
estimate, or absolute value of actual earnings, or price, respectively.

In addition to firm-level ambiguity, there are also studies concerning market-wide
ambiguity. Williams (2009) investigates investors’ asymmetric responses to good and
4

Mayew and Venkatachalam (2012) analyze earnings conference calls and find that managerial vocal cues in
conference calls contain useful information. They find that when analysts make stock recommendation changes, they
incorporate positive but not negative cues. We acknowledge that the proposed upward earnings forecasts may create a
bias on our measures of uncertainty.
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bad news when faced with ambiguity. His ambiguity measure is changes in market-wide
volatility (VIX). Using this measure, he reports that investors respond asymmetrically
following increases in VIX, weighting bad earnings news more than good earnings news.
However, following a decrease in VIX, investors respond symmetrically, weighting bad
earnings news the same as good earnings news. Similarly, Anderson et al (2009) use the
degree of disagreement of professional forecasters as a proxy for uncertainty in the
economy. However, unlike our measure of ambiguity, which focuses on disagreement
about individual stocks, his measure is based on aggregate measures of disagreement.

C. Multivariate regressions

We test predictions made by Easley and O’Hara (2010) that show specific
features of certification can reduce perceived ambiguity and ultimately improve firm
liquidity. In equation (7), we empirically test our first hypothesis that certification
services can reduce ambiguity. Applying the governance indices (more details in the
following sections), we expect firm specific certification services to be negatively
correlated with ambiguity. In equation (8), we test whether there is a significant
relationship between liquidity and ambiguity. We use quoted spread, effective spread,
Amihud illiquidity, and turnover ratio as firm level measures of liquidity.
Control variables, such as firm size, return volatility, analysts following,
institutional holdings, and dummies for exchanges and years, are also included (Chung,
Elder & Kim, 2010; McInish & Wood, 1992; Stoll, 2000). Easley and O’Hara (2010)
suggest that small cap firms tend to have greater ambiguity around their returns than the
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returns of large firms. A negative correlation between ambiguity and firm size would also
be consistent with Diether et al. (2002), Brown et al. (1987), and Atiase (1985).
Consistent with Diether et al. (2002), Alford and Berger (1999), and Thomas (2002), we
also expect firms with higher volatility to face more ambiguity.
Diether et al. (2002) find that analysts’ forecast dispersion is positively correlated
with analyst coverage. They suggest that the demand for expert opinions will be higher in
those situations when earnings are difficult to estimate. However, Cho and Harter (1995)
find that as the number of analysts increases, the dispersion of analysts’ beliefs decreases.
We will turn to our data for further empirical evidence on the relationship between
dispersion and analysts following. Institutional investors have more resources on
information acquisition and processing and are more likely to engage in shareholder
activism. Thus, we expect that ambiguity is negatively correlated with institutional
holdings. Williams (2009) finds that changes in VIX are positively correlated with the
analysts’ forecast dispersion of earnings. Therefore, we also include VIX and expect a
positive correlation between changes in VIX and our ambiguity measure.

(7)

(8)
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III. Data sample

In order to construct our firm-specific certification measures, we turn to corporate
governance data as provided by Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS). ISS data has
been widely used in the literature (Aggrawal, Erel, Stulz & Williamson, 2009; Aggrawal
& Williamson, 2006; Brown & Caylor, 2006; Bruno & Claessens, 2010; Chung & Zhang,
2009). ISS coverage includes S&P 500 Large-Cap Index stocks, S&P 400 Mid-Cap Index
stocks, S&P 600 Small-Cap Index stocks, and Russell 3000 stocks. In addition, ISS
provides 62 corporate governance standards in the following eight categories: board of
directors, audit, charter and bylaw provisions, anti-takeover provisions, executive and
director compensation, progressive practices, ownership, and director education. Because
corporate governance standards cover different aspects of corporate governance issues, it
is not realistic to expect that all dimensions of corporate governance can reduce
ambiguity.
While some corporate governance standards can help the firm reduce ambiguity,
other corporate standards may have no effect on ambiguity at all. Recently, several
studies (Bebchuk, Cohen & Ferrell, 2009; Brown & Caylor, 2006) only use a selected
group of all available items of corporate governance standards in their research, as
opposed to the “kitchen sink” approach and assuming that all governance standards have
equal effects on the variables of interest.
Following Brown and Caylor’s (2006) approach, we create 38 dummies for those
governance standards and regress our ambiguity measures on the dummies in order to
identify the set of governance standards that are closely related to a reduction in
ambiguity. After identifying the governance standards that cause a reduction in
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ambiguity, we construct an index for each firm by awarding one point for each
governance standard that is met, an approach similar to the method used by Brown and
Caylor (2006) and Chung, Elder, and Kim (2010). We determine whether a specific
governance standard is met using the minimum standard provided in ISS Corporate
Governance: Best Practices User Guide and Glossary (2003).
We retrieve data on analysts’ earnings forecast, number of analysts, standard
deviations of analysts forecast, and actual earnings from the Institutional Brokers
Estimate System (I/B/E/S) database. The data is based on unadjusted U.S. Summary
History data files in the I/B/E/S. Diether et al. (2002, p.2117) emphasize the importance
of using unadjusted earnings data. We use forecast estimates reported for the day closest
to, but preceding, the day in which quarterly actual earnings are released. Brown and Han
(1992) demonstrate the significance of using updated analysts' forecasts. We use
companies for which forecasts of earnings per share are available in the I/B/E/S files
between the second quarter of 2001 and the first quarter of 2007.
We extract price, market cap, shares outstanding, and return data from CRSP. Log
(Firm Size) is the log of the average daily market cap of the firm over the quarter. Price is
the daily closing price when analysts made their earnings forecast. Return Volatility is the
square root of the sum of daily return squares for the quarter. Change in institutional
ownership is compiled from data on quarterly institutional ownership taken from the
Compact Disclosure-CDA/Spectrum Institutional (13f) holdings database. Volatility
Index (VIX) computed by the Chicago Board Options Exchange is a measure of market
expectations of near-term volatility conveyed by S&P 500 stock index option prices.
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Change in VIX (3-1) is the last month average VIX minus the first month average VIX
for each quarter.
We obtain data for liquidity variables from the Trade and Quote (TAQ) database.
Consistent with the approach frequently used in the market microstructure literature, as a
means of error minimization, we apply the following data filters. Trades and quotes
which are out of the time sequence are omitted. Quotes are also omitted if either the ask
or bid price was equal to or less than zero, either the bid or ask depth was equal to or less
than zero, and either the price or volume was equal to or less than zero. Quotes were
deleted if the bid-ask spread was greater than $5. Following Huang and Stoll (1996), data
errors are also minimized by eliminating quotes that indicate a negative spread. Quotes
and trades before the open and after the close are also eliminated. Quoted Spread is the
daily average of time-weighted quoted percentage spread of stock i in quarter t. Effective
Spread is the daily mean of a volume-weighted effective percentage spread of stock i in
quarter t. From TAQ, we also compute other variables, such as return volatility (standard
deviation of returns calculated with daily closing mid-quote to mid-quote) and average
daily dollar trading volume.
To ensure that our results are not unduly affected by data errors, we also use the
following data filtering rules:
1) Each stock must be followed by more than one analyst. If a stock is followed by
only one analyst, then the standard deviation of analysts forecast would be zero.
2) The stock must be traded on NYSE, AMEX, or NASDAQ.
3) Stock prices of the companies cannot be less than $5 dollar nor greater than $100.
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4) Stock has to be included in I/B/E/S, CRSP, CDA/Spectrum and ISS Governance
databases.

IV. Empirical Results

A. Corporate Governance Index

We start by listing all 38 ISS corporate governance standards and their categories
in Appendix 1.5 As was noted earlier, since those governance standards cover different
aspects of corporate governance issues, we recognize that not all dimensions of corporate
governance measures can reduce ambiguity.
Following the methodology of Brown and Caylor (2006), to identify those
governance standards which reduce ambiguity, we create 38 dummies for those
governance standards and regress our ambiguity measure, Log (Uncertainty), on all 38
individual ISS corporate governance standards and a set of control variables. The control
variables are Log (Firm Size), Return Volatility, Number of Analysts, Change in VIX(31), Change in Institutional Holdings, and year dummies.
Table 1 shows that 17 governance standards have negative correlations with our
ambiguity measure. After identifying the governance standards that are associated with a
reduction in ambiguity, we construct two indices for each firm by awarding one point for
each governance standard that is met. Appendix 2 shows the components of first

5

Although the ISS data consist of 62 governance standards, we only choose these 38 standards that are
available from 2001 to 2007. While some of these 62 standards were added to the ISS data later years, other standards
were discontinued later years.
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governance index (Gov-Index1). Gov-Index1 is the sum of all governance standards
identified in Table 1.

Table 1
Governance Provisions and Firm-Specific Uncertainty
Log (Uncertainty) is regressed on all 38 individual ISS corporate governance standards, and control variables (41,286
observations). Log (Uncertainty) is our firm specific uncertainty or ambiguity measure (Barron et al., 2009) from
Equation (1). The control variables are Log (Market Cap), Return Volatility, Number of Analysts, Change in VIX (31), Change in Institutional Holdings, and year dummies. Log (Market Cap) is the log of the firm’s average daily market
cap over the quarter. Return Volatility is the square root of the sum of daily return squares for the quarter. Volatility
Index (VIX), computed by the Chicago Board Options Exchange, is a measure of market expectations of near-term
volatility as conveyed by S&P 500 stock index option prices. Change in VIX (3-1) is the last month’s average of VIX
minus the first month’s average of VIX Index for each quarter. We use change in institutional ownership as a control
variable from the Compact Disclosure-CDA/Spectrum Institutional (13f) holdings database. We calculated quarterly
institutional ownership for the firms. The data is available from the second quarter of 2001 to the first quarter of 2007.
For brevity, we exclude coefficient estimates for the intercept and control variables. We report the statistical
significance for all results based on White’s heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors.
Coefficient
estimate
-0.184***

Governance Provisions
CEO serves on the boards of two or fewer public companies
Board is controlled by more than 50% independent outside directors

-0.019

Majority vote requirement to amend charter/bylaws (not supermajority)

-0.007

Outside directors can meet without CEO

-0.001

Board cannot amend bylaws without shareholder approval or can only do so under limited circumstances

-0.070

Does not ignore shareholder proposals

-0.144

Audit committee comprised solely of independent outsiders

-0.011

Single class, common (There is no dual-class capital structure in place)

-0.090**

Shareholders may call special meetings

-0.101***

Shareholders may act by written consent

-0.017

Company either has no poison pill or has a pill that was shareholder approved

-0.160***

Company is not authorized to issue blank checks preferred

-0.154***

No interlocks among compensation committee members

-0.450***

All stock-incentive plans adopted with shareholder approval

-0.054**

All directors with more than one year of service own stock

-0.191***

Officers’ and directors’ stock ownership is at least 1%, but not over 30%, of total shares outstanding

-0.307***

Incorporation in a state without any anti-takeover provisions

-0.234***

*** and ** represent 1% and 5% significance levels, respectively.
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Appendix 2 shows the 17 governance standards of Gov-Index1 and their five
categories. Categories of the governance standards are defined in the following ways:


Board - governance standards that are related to the effective functioning of
the board, its independence, and transparency



Audit – governance standards that are related to the independence of the audit
committee



Antitakeover provisions – governance standards that are related to dual-class
structure, shareholders rights, the poison pill, and blank check preferred stock



Compensation and Ownership - governance standards that are related to
officers’ and directors’ options and stock ownership and the monitoring of
those compensation plans



State – governance standards that are related to anti-takeover provisions in a
state

Categorical attributes are represented as follows: Board (6), Audit (1), Antitakeover (5), Compensation and Ownership (4), State (1). We consider each of those
governance attributes in detail.
Board: The CEO should not serve on more than two other boards of public
companies. Multiple board membership by CEO’s can deprive their own firm of the
CEO’s time and attention. The board is controlled by more than 50% independent outside
directors. Because independent directors are less likely to have conflicts of interest, they
can monitor and evaluate the performance of the management team more effectively.
Ajinkya et al. (2005) and Karamanou and Vafeas (2005) find that boards that do a
more effective job of monitoring management enhance the quality and the frequency of
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information released by management. They conclude that firms with more effective
boards issue earnings forecasts more often and those forecasts tend to be more accurate.
A simple majority vote should be required to amend the charter/bylaws. Requiring
supermajority vote to amend the charter/bylaws may allow management to entrench itself
by blocking amendments that are in the best interests of shareholders.
Another attribute in the Board category is whether outside directors can meet
without the CEO present. The ability to conduct such meetings can help outside directors
discuss sensitive topics such as CEO performance and succession planning.
Audit: Audit committee composed solely of independent outsiders: The audit
committee is tasked with reviewing the adequacy and effectiveness of the company’s
internal auditing, accounting, and financial controls; reviews the conduct and report of
the company's independent auditors; and makes recommendations concerning the
appointment of the independent auditor. This governance provision can improve the
quality of the financial statements by preventing management from expropriating the
firm’s resources or misreporting firm performance.
Anti-Takeover: Absence of a dual class capital structure: Management can thwart
hostile takeovers attempted through the purchase of common shares by possessing shares
with voting rights superior to the common shares held by other shareholders. Li, OrtizMolina, and Zhao (2008) find the dual-class standard to be an important determinant of
institutional investment decisions.
Shareholders should be permitted to call special meetings: With this provision,
shareholders do not have to wait for the next scheduled meeting to get rid of directors or
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introduce a shareholder resolution. This method of monitoring can improve the firm’s
stock return and reduce the uncertainty associated with it.
The next attribute in the Anti-Takeover category is whether shareholder may act
by written consent: Written consent can protect shareholders’ interests. With written
consent, shareholders can remove directors or initiate a shareholder resolution without
having to wait for the next scheduled meeting. Another attribute in the Anti-Takeover
category is whether a company either has no poison pill or a pill that was shareholder
approved. Poison pills are one of the most prevalent takeover defenses and can: (1) dilute
the acquirer's equity holdings in the target company; (2) dilute the acquirer's voting
interests in the target company; or (3) dilute the acquirer's equity holdings in the postmerger company. Thus, poison pills can enable management entrenchment and
discourage legitimate tender offers. Following attribute in the Anti-Takeover category is
whether a company is not authorized to issue blank check preferred. Blank check
preferred can dilute existing shareholders’ equity and voting positions. Management can
use blank check preferred stock as an entrenchment device.
Compensation and Ownership: There would be no interlocks among
compensation committee members. Compensation committee interlocks happen when the
CEO of firm1 serves as a director on the compensation committee of firm 2, and the CEO
of firm 2 serves as a director on the compensation committee of firm 1. This governance
standard ensures that shareholders interests may not be damaged due to the conflict of
interest associated with the interlocking directors.
Another attribute in Compensation and Ownership category is whether all stockbased incentive plans require prior shareholder for approval. This attribute ensures that
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shareholders could have a say on one of the most economically important issues for the
firm. The next attribute in this category is whether all directors with more than one year
of service should own stock. In this way, directors align their own interests with those of
shareholders through ownership of the firm’s stock. Since directors are required to put
their own money at risk by purchasing stock in the firm, directors will not take actions
that can hurt the interest of shareholders. Bebchuk and Fried (2003) have found that
directors with equity-based compensation can monitor management more effectively.
Similar to the previous attribute, officers’ and directors’ stock ownership is at
least 1%, but not over 30%, of total shares outstanding. Officers’ and directors’ stock
ownership can align the interests of officers and directors with those of shareholders.
Core and Larcker (2002) find that higher-equity ownership of management results in
higher stock returns. Finally, we include whether or not the firm is incorporated in a state
without anti-takeover statutes. Management of firms that are incorporated in those states
can use the absence of state anti-takeover statutes as a means of entrenching themselves
to the detriment of shareholders.
Appendix 3 shows the components of our second governance index, Gov-Index2,
which includes only the 10 governance standards that are significant at 5% in Table 1.
We weigh each governance standards in governance indices equally.

B. Summary Statistics

Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics of Uncertainty, Governance Indices,
Trading Cost, and Control Variables for our sample of firms. The average Log
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(Uncertainty) is -9.413. The minimum and maximum values of Gov-Index1 are 0 and 16.
The average (median) value of Gov-Index1 is 10.393 (10). Thus, firms in our sample
meet more than 61% of the governance standards. The mean value of Gov-Index2 is
6.494. The minimum and maximum values of Gov-Index2 are 0 and 10. The average
daily quoted and effective spreads are 0.47 and 0.36 percent, respectively. The number of
analysts for the overall sample is 8.3; it ranges from a minimum of 2 to a maximum of
41. The return volatility is 0.189. Finally, the average market value of equity is $5,356
million.
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Table 2
Descriptive Statistics of Uncertainty, Governance Indices, Trading Costs, and
Control Variables
Log (Uncertainty) is our firm specific uncertainty or ambiguity measure (Barron et al., 2009) from
Equation (1). We also use three alternative ambiguity proxies identified in the literature as a robustness
check (Atiase & Bamber, 1994; Avramov et al., 2009; Diether et al., 2002; Johnson, 2004; Lustgarten &
Mande, 1998; Thomas, 2002;). These are STD/ABS (Mean Earnings Estimate), STD/Price, and STD/ABS
(Actual Earnings). Analysts Earnings Forecast Dispersion is the standard deviation of dispersion of
earnings forecast estimates for the quarter, based on data from the I/B/E/S database for the time period
2001 to 2007. STD/ABS (Mean Earnings Estimate) is Analysts Earnings Forecast Dispersion scaled by the
absolute value of the mean earnings estimate. STD/Price is Analysts Earnings Forecast Dispersion scaled
by price. STD/ABS (Actual Earnings) is Analysts Earnings Forecast Dispersion scaled by the absolute
value of actual earnings. Appendix 2 shows the components of the first governance index (Gov-Index1),
which is the sum of all the governance standards identified in Table 1. Appendix 3 shows the components
of the second governance index (Gov-Index2). Gov-Index2 includes only those governance standards that
are significant at 10%. Quoted Spread is the daily average of time-weighted quoted percentage spread of
stock i in quarter t. Effective Spread is the daily mean of volume-weighted effective percentage spread of
stock i in quarter t. Amihud is the daily average ratio of the absolute stock return to its dollar volume in
quarter t. Turnover is the daily mean ratio of dollar volume to the shares outstanding in quarter t. Price is
the closing price on the day when analysts made their earnings forecast. We use change in institutional
ownership as a control variable from the Compact Disclosure-CDA/Spectrum Institutional (13f) holdings
database. We calculated quarterly institutional ownership for the firms. Volatility Index (VIX) as computed
by the Chicago Board Options Exchange is a measure of market expectations of near-term volatility,
conveyed by S&P 500 stock index option prices. Change in VIX (3-1) is last month’s average of VIX
minus the first-month VIX Index average for each quarter. Return Volatility is the square root of the sum of
daily return squares for the quarter. The data are available from the second quarter of 2001 to the first
quarter of 2007.
Variables

N

MEAN

MEDIAN

STD

MAX

MIN

Log (Uncertainty)

37528

-9.413

STD/ABS (Mean Earnings Estimate)

37267

0.184

-9.565

2.09

1.339

-13.978

0.063

0.575

41

0.003

STD/Price

37528

0.002

0.001

0.004

0.229

0

STD/ABS (Actual Earnings)

37266

0.178

0.061

0.593

43

0.002

Gov-Index1

37528

10.393

10

1.618

16

0

Gov-Index2

37528

6.494

6

1.087

10

0

Quoted Spread

36851

0.474

0.224

0.688

11.713

0.018

Effective Spread

36851

0.362

0.194

0.477

25.074

0.024

Amihud

37528

1.804

0.246

9.518

633.533

0.000

Turnover

37528

0.837

0.608

0.910

57.687

0.023

Price

37528

28.018

24.57

17.318

99.97

5.01

Number of Analysts

37528

8.305

6

5.998

41

2

Change in Institutional Holdings
Change in VIX (3-1)

37528
37528

0.012
-0.339

0.008
-0.342

0.064
4.253

0.893
13.962

-0.894
-10.395

Return Volatility
Market Cap (in millions)

37528
37528

0.189
5,357

0.167
1,032

0.098
19,519

1.414
427,919

0.008
23
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In Table 3, we divide the sample into three subgroups. Means of the variables in
those three subgroups are shown in the first three columns. The differences between High
Uncertainty and Low Uncertainty subgroups for our variables of interest are shown in the
fourth column. Table 3 suggests that companies with high firm specific uncertainty tend
to have lower price, market cap, corporate governance, and number of analysts following.
Those firms are also likely to have higher volatility, quoted spread and effective spread.
Surprisingly, institutional holding and turnover are higher for firms with higher
uncertainty.

Table 3
Effect of Firm Specific Uncertainty
The sample is divided into three subgroups. Means of the variables in those three subgroups are shown in
the first three columns. The difference between High Uncertainty and Low Uncertainty subgroups of
variables are shown in the fourth column. Log (Uncertainty), Price, Number of Analysts, Institutional
Holdings, Return Volatility, Market Cap, Quoted Spread, Effective Spread, Amihud, Turnover, GovIndex1, and Gov-Index2 are defined in Table 2.
Variables

Low Uncertainty
(N = 12385)

Medium Uncertainty
(N = 12383)

High Uncertainty
(N = 12760)

Difference
(High - Low)

Log (Uncertainty)

-11.648

-9.586

-7.076

4.57***

Price
Number of Analysts

30.471
9.446

27.391
8.263

26.245
7.240

-4.23***
-2.21***

Institutional Holdings

0.652

0.655

0.660

0.01***

Return Volatility
Market Cap (in millions)

0.174
7,396

0.187
4,866

0.205
3,853

0.03***
-3,543***

Quoted Spread

0.432

0.480

0.510

0.08***

Effective Spread

0.330

0.363

0.391

0.06***

Amihud

1.460

1.760

2.181

0.72***

Turnover

0.772

0.828

0.907

0.13***

Gov-Index1

10.439

10.399

10.341

-0.1***

Gov-Index2
6.566
*** represents 1% significance level.

6.498

6.421

-0.14***
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Figure 1 shows time-series relation between firm specific level uncertainty and
macro level uncertainty during bearish and bullish periods. The figure shows quarterly
mean of Log (Uncertainty) and quarterly percentage of VIX. Figure 1 confirms that as
macro level uncertainty increases, firm specific level uncertainty measure also increases.
The graph also suggests that during the bearish periods, firm level uncertainty and macro
level uncertainty move up in tandem. When the economy is acknowledged to be in
recession by the NBER, the quarter is defined as bearish.

-9.3

-9.4

B
e
a
r

200206

B
e
a
r

200306

B
e
a
r

200406

200506

200606

B
e
a
r

B
e
a
r

60
200706
40
20

0

-9.5

-20

-9.6

-40

-9.7

-60
Log (Uncertainty)

VIX

Log (Uncertainty)

-9.1
200106
-9.2

VIX

Figure 1
Firm Specific Uncertainty and Macro Level Uncertainty during bullish and bearish markets
This figure shows quarterly mean of Log (Uncertainty) and quarterly percentage change of VIX during
bullish and bearish periods. When the economy is acknowledged to be in recession by the NBER, the
quarter is defined as bearish. Log (Uncertainty) is our firm specific uncertainty or ambiguity measure
(Barron et al., 2009) from Equation (1). Volatility Index (VIX) as computed by the Chicago Board Options
Exchange is a measure of market expectations of near-term volatility, conveyed by S&P 500 stock index
option prices.
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Table 4 shows the correlation coefficients between our main variables. The
correlation coefficients between Log (Uncertainty) and Gov-Index1 and Gov-Index2 are 0.031 and -0.06, respectively, and those coefficients are statistically significant at 1%.
The correlation between Change in VIX (3-1) and Log (Uncertainty) is 0.021 and is
statistically significant at 1%. The correlation coefficients between Log (Uncertainty) and
Quoted Spread and Effective Spread are -0.06 and -0.069, respectively, and are
statistically significant at 1%. Therefore, univariate results suggest that firm-level
certification practices through better corporate governance can help to reduce ambiguity.
A reduction in ambiguity is also significantly related to higher liquidity of firms or lower
transaction costs. It is also reassuring to see that our main ambiguity measure Log
(Uncertainty) has positive correlations with alternative measures based on the standard
deviation of analysts’ forecasts, regardless of the deflator used.
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Table 4
Pearson Correlation Coefficients
STD/ABS
(Mean
Earnings
Estimate)

STD/Price

STD/ABS(
Actual
Earnings)

Log(Unce
rtainty)

Gov-Index1

GovIndex2

Quoted
Spread

Effective
Spread

Amihud

Turnover

Number
of
Analysts

STD/ABS(Mean
Earnings Estimate)
STD/Price
STD/ABS(Actual
Earnings)
Log(Uncertainty)
Gov-Index1
Gov-Index2
Quoted Spread
Effective Spread
Amihud
Turnover
Number of Analysts

0.281***
0.317***

1
0.216***

1

0.211***
-0.028***
-0.029***
0.069***
0.081***
0.042***
0.031***
-0.067***

0.424***
-0.045***
-0.048***
0.096***
0.11***
0.053***
0.06***
-0.093***

0.182***
-0.028***
-0.030***
0.052***
0.062***
0.025***
0.024***
-0.051***

1
-0.031***
-0.060***
0.060***
0.069***
0.04***
0.078***
-0.160***

1
0.761***
-0.064***
-0.087***
-0.012**
-0.021***
-0.012**

1
0.060***
0.044***
0.034***
-0.056***
-0.119***

1
0.925***
0.438***
-0.117***
-0.347***

1
0.392***
-0.086***
-0.334***

1
-0.109***
-0.152***

1
0.186***

1

Change in VIX (3-1)

0.000

0.008

-0.001

0.021***

0.017***

0.014***

-0.046***

-0.037***

-0.016***

0.005

-0.007

Change
in VIX
(3-1)

1

***, **, and * represent 1, 5, and 10% significance levels, respectively.
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1

C. Main Empirical Results on Hypothesis 1

We proceed to test our first hypothesis on whether better corporate governance
can help reduce firm-specific ambiguity in a multivariate framework. In Table 5, we use
our primary proxy for firm-specific ambiguity, Log (Uncertainty), as our dependent
variable. The coefficient of Gov-Index1 in the first specification is -0.051 and is
statistically significant at 1%. Thus, better corporate governance can reduce uncertainty
associated with the firm’s value. Williams (2009) finds that changes in VIX are
positively correlated with the analysts’ forecast dispersion of earnings. We find a similar
result in such that market level ambiguity is also positively and significantly related to
Log (uncertainty). The coefficient for the number of analysts is -0.052 and is statistically
significant at 1%. This finding is consistent with Cho and Harter’s (1995) finding that as
the number of analysts increases, dispersion of analyst’s belief decreases. The adjusted R2
of the regression is 0.059. The anticipated signs for our control variables are consistent
with our empirical finding. The results are qualitatively similar when Gov-Index2 is used.
The coefficient of Gov-Index2 is -0.154 and remains statistically significant at 1%. The
statistical significance for all our results is based on White’s heteroskedasticity-consistent
standard errors.
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Table 5
Corporate Governance and Firm-Specific Uncertainty
This table examines the effect of corporate governance on the level of firm-specific uncertainty. The
dependent variable is Log (Uncertainty). Log (Uncertainty) is our firm specific uncertainty or ambiguity
measure (Barron et al., 2009) from Equation (1). Appendix 2 shows the components of first governance
index (Gov-Index1). Gov-Index1 is the sum of all governance standards identified in Table 1. Appendix 3
shows the component of our second governance index (Gov-Index2). Gov-Index2 includes only those
governance standards that are significant at 5%. Log (Market Cap) is log of average daily market cap of the
firm over the quarter. Return Volatility is square root of sum of daily return squares for the quarter.
Volatility Index (VIX) computed by the Chicago Board Options Exchange is a measure of market
expectations of near-term volatility conveyed by S&P 500 stock index option prices. Change in VIX (3-1)
is last month’s average of VIX minus the first month average of VIX Index for each quarter. We use
change in institutional ownership as a control variable from Compact Disclosure-CDA/Spectrum
Institutional (13f) holdings database. We calculated quarterly institutional ownership for the firms. The data
is available from the second quarter of 2001 to the first quarter of 2007. We report the statistical
significance for all results based on White’s heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors.

(7)

Variables
Intercept

Anticipated Sign

Log(Uncertainty)

Log(Uncertainty)

[1]
-8.860***

[2]
-8.175***

Gov-Index1

-

-0.051***

Gov-Index2

-

Log (Market Cap)

-

Return Volatility

+

3.995***

3.890***

Number of Analysts

-

-0.052***

-0.053***

Change in VIX (3-1)

+

0.008***

0.008***

Change in Institutional Holdings
Year Dummies

-

-0.470***
Yes

-0.480***
Yes

Adj-R2

0.0598

0.0646

N

37528

37528

-0.154***
0.004

***, **, and * represent 1, 5, and 10% significance levels, respectively.
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-0.009

For robustness, we also use alternative firm-specific ambiguity measures in Table
6. Our dependent variables are: Analysts Earning Forecast Dispersion scaled by absolute
value of mean earnings estimate; Analysts Earning Forecast Dispersion scaled by price;
and Analysts’ Earnings Forecast Dispersion scaled by absolute value of actual earnings.
The coefficients of Gov-Index1 and Gov-Index2 are all negative and statistically
significant at 1% in all regressions. The results in Table 6 are similar to those reported in
Table 5. Thus, we find support for our first hypothesis that better corporate governance is
significantly negatively related to the firm-specific ambiguity.

87

Table 6
Corporate Governance and Alternative Firm-Specific Uncertainty Proxies
For robustness, we also test the results in Table 5 by using three alternative ambiguity proxies used in the
literature (Atiase & Bamber, 1994; Avramov et al., 2009; Diether et al., 2002; Johnson, 2004; Lustgarten
and Mande, 1998; Thomas, 2002). These are STD/ABS (Mean Earnings Estimate), STD/Price, and
STD/ABS (Actual Earnings). Analysts Earnings Forecast Dispersion is (standard deviation-STD) the
dispersion of earnings forecast estimates for each quarter from the I/B/E/S database from 2001 to 2007.
STD/ABS (Mean Earnings Estimate) is the Analysts Earnings Forecast Dispersion, as scaled by absolute
value of mean earnings estimate. STD/Price is the Analysts Earnings Forecast Dispersion as scaled by
price. STD/ABS (Actual Earnings) is the Analysts Earnings Forecast Dispersion as scaled by absolute
value of actual earnings. Appendix 2 shows the components of the first governance index (Gov-Index1).
Gov-Index1 is the sum of all governance standards identified in Table 1. Appendix 3 shows the
components of the second governance index (Gov-Index2). Gov-Index2 includes only those governance
standards that are significant at the 10% level. Log (Market Cap) is the log of the average daily market cap
of the firm over the quarter. Return Volatility is the square root of sum of daily return squares for the
quarter. Volatility Index (VIX) as computed by the Chicago Board Options Exchange is a measure of
market expectations of near-term volatility conveyed by S&P 500 stock index option prices. Change in
VIX (3-1) is the last month average of VIX minus the first month average of VIX Index for each quarter.
We use change in institutional ownership as a control variable taken from Compact DisclosureCDA/Spectrum Institutional (13f) holdings database. We calculated quarterly institutional ownership for
the firms. The data is available from the second quarter of 2001 to the first quarter of 2007. We report the
statistical significance for all results based on White’s heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors.
STD/ABS(M
ean Earnings
Estimate)

STD/ABS(M
ean Earnings
Estimate)

STD/Price

STD/Price

STD/ABS(
Actual
Earnings)

STD/ABS(
Actual
Earnings)

Variables
Intercept

[1]
0.601***

[2]
0.682***

[3]
0.004***

[4]
0.005***

[5]
0.553***

[6]
0.632***

Gov-Index1

-0.006***

Gov-Index2

-0.000***
-0.019***

-0.007***
-0.000***

-0.019***

Log (Market Cap)

-0.027***

-0.028***

-0.000***

-0.000***

-0.023***

-0.025***

Return Volatility

0.575***

0.562***

-0.007***

0.0068***

0.463***

0.451***

Number of Analysts

-0.001*

-0.001**

0.000***

0.0000***

0.000

-0.001

Change in VIX (3-1)

-0.000

-0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

Change in Institutional Holdings

0.009

0.008

-0.002***

-0.002***

0.019

0.018

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Adj-R2

0.021

0.021

0.053

0.055

0.013

0.014

N

37267

37267

37528

37528

37266

37266

Year Dummies

***, **, and * represent 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels, respectively.
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D. Main Empirical Results on Hypothesis 2

In Table 7, we examine the impact of firm-specific and market-wide uncertainties
on the firm’s liquidity. We calculate two types of transaction costs: Quoted Spread and
Effective Spread in percent. Quoted Spread in percent is computed as follows:

where Ai ,t and Bi ,t represent the best bid and offer, respectively, for firm i at time t.
Huang and Stoll (1996), Lee and Ready (1991), and Petersen and Fialkowski (1994) find
that trades are usually executed inside the bid-ask spread. Therefore, we also compute
Effective Spread in percent. Effective Spread in percent is computed as follows:

Mi ,t is the midpoint (Ai,t+Bi,t)/2 of the quoted spread for firm i at the time trade t occurs,
and Pi,t is the price of trade t in firm i’s stock.
In addition to the direct measures of liquidity, we use two indirect measures of
liquidity as a robustness check. Amihud (2002) is the ratio of the absolute stock return to
its dollar volume. Amihud illiquidity measure is considered to be the indirect measure of
price impact.

The second indirect measure of liquidity is Turnover ratio. Turnover is the
volume as a percentage of shares outstanding.
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In the first column, the dependent variable is the average quoted spread. Quoted
Spread is the daily average of time-weighted quoted percentage spread of stock i in
quarter t. The coefficient for Log (Uncertainty) variable is 0.014 and statistically
significant at 1%. Thus, there is clear evidence that firm-specific ambiguity can increase
liquidity, even after controlling for a large set of variables. Market Level Uncertainty is
an indicator variable that is set to 1 if a change in VIX (3-1) is positive and set to zero
otherwise. Change in VIX (3-1) is the last month average of VIX minus the first month
average of VIX Index for each quarter. The coefficient for Market Level Uncertainty
variable is 0.011 and statistically significant at 10%. This result is similar to the findings
of Williams (2009) that changes in VIX are positively correlated with the analysts’
forecast dispersion of earnings.
Additionally, we find that the coefficients for both trading volume and market cap
are negative and statistically significant. Those findings are also consistent with those
reported in Stoll (2000). Similar to the findings of Jiang and Kim (2005) and Chung,
Elder, and Kim (2010), we find that Quoted Spread is negatively associated with
institutional ownership. The Quoted Spread is positively and significantly related to the
number of analysts, consistent with the findings of Chung et al. (1995) that market
makers increase spreads for those stocks followed by many analysts. The adjusted R2 for
the first regression is 0.47.
In the second regression, the dependent variable is Effective Spread. Effective
Spread is the daily mean of volume-weighted effective percentage spread of stock i in
quarter t. The coefficient for Log (Uncertainty) is 0.010 and statistically significant at
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1%. We obtain qualitatively similar results for other control variables in the second
regression.
In the third column, the dependent variable is Amihud illiquidity measure.
Amihud is the daily mean ratio of the absolute stock return to its dollar volume in quarter
t. The coefficient for Log (Uncertainty) is positive and statistically significant at 1%. In
other words, high firm level uncertainty increases firm’s indirect measure of price impact.
In the fourth regression, our dependent variable is turnover ratio. The coefficient for Log
(Uncertainty) is negative and statistically significant at 5%. High firm level uncertainty
tends to reduce firm’s turnover ratio. Thus, our results are robust to different liquidity
measures. In conclusion, we find support for our second hypothesis that a reduction in
ambiguity is significantly and positively related to investor participation in the securities.
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Table 7
Liquidity and Uncertainty
In these regressions, we examine the impact of firm-specific and market-wide uncertainties on the firm’s
liquidity. The dependent variables are the average quoted spread and effective spreads for each quarter.
Quoted Spread is the daily average of the time-weighted quoted percentage spread of stock i in quarter t.
Effective Spread is the daily mean of the volume-weighted effective percentage spread of stock i in quarter
t. Amihud is the daily average ratio of the absolute stock return to its dollar volume in quarter t. Turnover is
the daily mean ratio of dollar volume to the shares outstanding in quarter t. Log (Uncertainty) is our firm
specific uncertainty or ambiguity measure (Barron et al., 2009) from Equation (1). Return Volatility is the
standard deviation of the daily closing quote-midpoint returns. Price is the mean stock price. Trading
Volume is the mean daily, dollar trading volume. Log (Market Cap) is a log of the average daily market cap
of the firm over the quarter. Number of Analysts is the number of analysts following firm i in quarter t.
Institutional Ownership is the percentage of shares held by institutions. Market Level Uncertainty is an
indicator variable that is set to 1 if a change in VIX (3-1) is positive and set to 0 otherwise. The NASDAQ
dummy variable is an indicator variable that is set to 1 if the stock is traded on NASDAQ. We also include
year dummy variables. We calculate t-statistics using White’s standard errors.

(8)
Quoted Spread

Effective Spread

Amihud

Turnover

Intercept

3.621***

2.404***

32.615***

-1.397***

Log(Uncertainty)

0.014***

0.010***

0.176***

-0.005**

Return Volatility

0.006

-0.006

10.001***

2.04***

Log(Trading Volume)

-0.086***

-0.025***

-2.223***

0.428***

Log(Market Cap)

-0.140***

-0.118***

-0.090

-0.268***

Number of Analysts

0.011***

0.006***

0.227***

0.001

Institutional Ownership (%)

-0.535***

-0.390***

-4.723***

0.287***

0.011*

0.009**

-0.012

-0.011

0.362***

0.237***

-0.11

0.183***

Year Dummies

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Adjusted R2

0.47

0.45

0.11

0.41

Market Level Uncertainty
NASDAQ Dummy

N
36851
36851
36851
***, **, and * represent 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels, respectively.
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36851

V. Econometric Issues

One may argue that Firm-Specific Uncertainty and Liquidity may be jointly and
simultaneously determined. Thus, we examine the direction of causality between FirmSpecific Uncertainty and Liquidity through the Granger causality test (Granger, 1969) in
Table 8.

(9)

(10)
If both

and

, we would infer an endogenous bi-directional relation

between Firm-Specific Uncertainty and Liquidity. If

but

that Firm-Specific Uncertainty affects Liquidity. If

but

that Liquidity affects Firm-Specific Uncertainty. If both
has no casual relation with Liquidity. We find that

, it is more likely
, it is more likely
and

, Uncertainty

is positive and significant while

is insignificant. Thus, we find a uni-directional relation where Firm-Specific Uncertainty
affects Liquidity, but not vice-versa. Equation (8) contains endogenous Log (Uncertainty)
variable together with exogenous control variables. OLS can be used in Equation (8)
since all the RHS variables in Equation (8) are uncorrelated with that equation’s error
term. In fact, Log (Uncertainty) is not correlated with the error term because there is no

93

Liquidity measure in Equation (7). Thus, OLS can be used in Equation (8). There is not a
simultaneity problem here, since the dependence is not bi-directional, for each equation it
all goes one way (Brooks, 2008 pg. 275).

Table 8
Granger Causality Test of Liquidity and Uncertainty
We take cross-sectional mean of the variables and run the following time-series
regressions:

(9)

(10)
Quoted Spread and Effective Spread are used as proxies for Liquidity Measure. Quoted
Spread is the daily average of the time-weighted quoted percentage spread of stock i in
quarter t. Effective Spread is the daily mean of the volume-weighted effective percentage
spread of stock i in quarter t. Log (Uncertainty) is our firm specific uncertainty or
ambiguity measure (Barron et al., 2009) from Equation (1).
∆Liquidity Measuret

∆Log(Uncertainty)t

(∆Quoted Spreadt)

∆Liquidity Measuret

∆Log(Uncertainty)t

(∆Effective Spreadt)

Intercept

0.004

0.007

0.001

0.005

∆Quoted Spreadt-1

0.229

-0.123

0.256**

-0.101

0.181

-0.289

0.231***

-0.115

∆Return Volatilityt

0.183

1.606

0.493

1.578

∆Log(Trading Volume)t

-0.004

-0.345

-0.008

-0.374

∆Effective Spreadt-1
∆Log(Uncertainty)t-1

∆Log(Market Cap)t

-0.827***

-0.239

-0.467***

-0.239

∆Number of Analystst

0.047

0.151*

-0.025

0.149*

∆Institutional Ownership (%)t

-1.254

1.077

-1.159**

1.037

0.069**

0.020

0.042**

0.022

0.397

-0.218

0.520

-0.198

22

22

22

22

∆Market Level Uncertaintyt
Adjusted R2
N

***, **, and * represent 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels, respectively.
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VI. Conclusion

Anderson et al (2009) state “Uncertainty by no means provides a complete
explanation of the cross section of stock returns, but there is evidence that uncertainty
matters.” While several papers in the literature have studied the importance of uncertainty
in asset pricing, other implications of uncertainty remain relatively unexplored.
Specifically, can a moderation in uncertainty/ambiguity be associated with better
liquidity for the firm? And what are the internal certification practices that can help to
reduce firm-level ambiguity? This paper empirically investigates how firm-specific
certification practices through corporate governance can reduce perceived ambiguity and
thus enhance liquidity of a firm in the stock market.
Using ISS and IBES data from 2001-2007 for US firms, we first test whether
corporate governance standards help to reduce firm level ambiguity, and additionally
whether the reduction in ambiguity has positive welfare gains such as better liquidity.
Our results suggest that better corporate governance does reduce firm-specific ambiguity.
Furthermore, a moderation in ambiguity is associated with better liquidity of firms. A
lower level of firm-specific ambiguity is positively associated with measures of liquidity
such as quoted spread and effective spread. Our results are robust to alternative model
specifications, measures of ambiguity, and corporate governance indices, and remain
statistically significant after controlling for other determinants of ambiguity and liquidity.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study on the relation between
ambiguity and liquidity and provides new empirical evidence on the role of ambiguity in
capital markets. Not only it adds to our understanding of how ambiguity can be
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moderated through firm-level certification practices, it also highlights the importance of a
subset of corporate governance metrics that are directly related to a reduction in
ambiguity. More importantly, our new findings on the relation between ambiguity and
stock market liquidity light on the channel through which a moderation of ambiguity
affects shareholder wealth.
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Appendix 1
Governance Categories and Factors used by Institutional Shareholder Service (ISS)
This appendix reports 38 governance standards. The standards are drawn from data
compiled by Institutional Shareholder Service (ISS).
ISS Governance Categories
BOARD
1. CEO serves on the boards of two or fewer public companies
2. Board is controlled by more than 50% independent outside directors
3. Majority vote requirement to amend charter/bylaws (not supermajority)
4. Board approved succession plan in place for the CEO
5. Outside directors meet without CEO
6. Board cannot amend bylaws without shareholder approval or can only do so under
limited circumstances
7. Does not ignore shareholder proposals
8. Board size is greater than five but less than 16
9. No former CEO on the board
10. Compensation committee composed solely of independent outsiders
11. Chairman and CEO are separated, or there is a lead director
12. Nominating committee composed solely of independent outsiders
13. Governance committee exists and met in the past year
14. Governance guidelines are publicly disclosed
15. Annually elected board (no staggered board)
16. Shareholders have cumulative voting rights
17. Board has the express authority to hire its own advisors
18. Performance of the board is reviewed regularly
19. Directors are required to submit resignation upon a job change
20. Qualifies for proxy contest defenses combination points
AUDIT
21. Audit committee composed solely of independent outsiders
ANTI-TAKEOVER
22. Single class, common
23. Shareholders may call special meetings
24. Shareholder may act by written consent
25. Company either has no poison pill or a pill that was shareholder approved
26. Company is not authorized to issue blank check preferred stock
27. Majority vote requirement to approve mergers (not supermajority)
COMPENSATION & OWNERSHIP
28. No interlocks among compensation committee members
29. All stock incentive plans adopted with shareholder approval
30. All directors with more than one year of service own stock
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31. Officers’ and directors’ stock ownership is at least 1%, but not over 30%, of total
shares outstanding
32. Repricing is prohibited or option repricing is prohibited without prior shareholder
approval
33. The last time shareholders voted on a pay plan, ISS did not deem its cost to be
excessive
34. Directors are subject to stock ownership requirements
35. Executives are subject to stock ownership guidelines
36. Directors receive all or a portion of their fees in stock
STATE
37. Incorporation in a state without any antitakeover provisions
DIRECTOR EDUCATION
38. At least one member of the board has participated in an ISS-accredited director
education program
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Appendix 2
Gov-Index1
This appendix lists the 17 governance standards that show a negative relationship with
the uncertainty measure in equation (1). The standards are drawn from data compiled by
the Institutional Shareholder Service (ISS). The appendix shows the cross reference of
our governance standards to the Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003, GIM) and Aggarwal,
Erel, Stulz, and Williamson (2009, AESW) standards. GIM’s index is based on 22
governance standards and AESW is based on 44 governance standards.
ISS Governance Categories
BOARD
1. CEO serves on the boards of two or fewer public
companies
2. Board is controlled by more than 50% independent outside
directors
3. Majority vote requirement to amend charter/bylaws (not
supermajority)
4. Outside directors can meet without CEO
5. Board cannot amend bylaws without shareholder approval
or can only do so under limited circumstances
6. Board does not ignore shareholder proposal
AUDIT
7. Audit committee comprised solely of independent
outsiders
ANTI-TAKEOVER
8. Single class, common
9. Shareholders may call special meetings
10. Shareholder may act by written consent
11. Company either has no poison pill or a pill that was
shareholder approved
12. Company is not authorized to issue blank check preferred
stock
COMPENSATION & OWNERSHIP
13. No interlocks among compensation committee members
14. All stock incentive plans adopted with shareholder
approval
15. All directors with more than one year of service own
stock
16. Officers’ and directors’ stock ownership is at least 1%,
but not over 30%, of total shares outstanding
STATE
17. Incorporation in a state without any antitakeover
provisions
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GIM(#)

GOV44(#)

Board(#2)
Board(#3)
Voting(#5)

Board(#17)
Board(#21)

Voting(#1,2)

Board(#23)
Board(#24)

Audit(#27)
Voting(#6)
Delay(#3)
Delay(#4)

Anti-Takeover(#29)
Anti-Takeover(#31)
Anti-Takeover(#32)

Other (#5)

Anti-Takeover(#33)

Delay(#1)

Anti-Takeover(#34)
Compensation&Ownership(#37)
Compensation&Ownership(#39)
Compensation&Ownership(#42)
Compensation&Ownership(#43)

State

Appendix 3
Gov-Index2
This appendix lists the 10 governance standards that show a significant negative
relationship with the uncertainty measure in equation (1). The standards are drawn from
data compiled by the Institutional Shareholder Service (ISS). The appendix shows the
cross reference of our governance standards to the Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003,
GIM) and Aggarwal, Erel, Stulz, and Williamson (2009, AESW) standards. GIM’s index
is based on 22 governance standards and AESW is based on 44 governance standards.
ISS Governance Categories
BOARD
1. CEO serves on the boards of two or fewer public companies
ANTI-TAKEOVER
2. Single class, common
3. Shareholders may call special meetings
4. Company either has no poison pill or a pill that was
shareholder approved
5. Company is not authorized to issue blank check preferred
stock
COMPENSATION & OWNERSHIP
6. No interlocks among compensation committee members
7. All stock incentive plans adopted with shareholder approval
8. All directors with more than one year of service own stock
9. Officers’ and directors’ stock ownership is at least 1%, but not
over 30%, of total shares outstanding
STATE
10. Incorporation in a state without any antitakeover provisions
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GIM(#)

GOV44(#)
Board(#2)

Voting(#6)
Delay(#3)

Anti-Takeover(#29)
Anti-Takeover(#31)

Other (#5)

Anti-Takeover(#33)

Delay(#1)

Anti-Takeover(#34)
Compensation&Ownership(#37)
Compensation&Ownership(#39)
Compensation&Ownership(#42)
Compensation&Ownership(#43)

State

CONCLUSIONS

My dissertation is composed of two essays. The first essay tests the effects of
corruption on financial transactions, capital investment inflows, and cost of equity
capital. The trade-off between the developmental and political aspects of corruption, as
well as the differential abilities of domestic and foreign institutional investors, potentially
generate non-linear effects of corruption that have not been previously explored in the
literature. We find that corruption decreases liquidity available to institutional traders and
discourages foreign portfolio investment inflows into the country. It increases investors’
order execution risks as well as corporations’ cost of equity capital. The effect of
corruption on foreign equity investment is nonlinear and reverse J-shaped, with
intermediate levels of corruption yielding the most negative effects on foreign portfolio
investment in our study of 49 countries. Firm level analysis of the U.S. FCPA violations
reveals that charges of corruption against a firm negatively affect its stock market
liquidity and equity investment while also increasing a stock’s order execution risk.
Charges of corruption also increase the firm’s cost of equity capital.
The second essay empirically investigates how firm-specific certification
practices through corporate governance can reduce perceived ambiguity and thus enhance
liquidity of a firm in the stock market. Our results suggest that better corporate
governance does reduce firm-specific ambiguity. Furthermore, a moderation in ambiguity
is associated with better liquidity of firms. A lower level of firm-specific ambiguity is
positively associated with measures of liquidity such as quoted spread and effective
spread. Our results are robust to alternative model specifications, measures of ambiguity,
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and corporate governance indices, and remain statistically significant after controlling for
other determinants of ambiguity and liquidity.
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